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An  Essay on the Semantics, Logic,
Metaphysics, and Epistemology o f
Demonstratives and Other
Indexicals
David Kap lan l
I This paper was prepared for and read (with omissions) at a symposium on Demon-
stratives at the March 1977 meetings of  the Pacific Division of the American
Philosophical Association, The commentators were Paul Benacerraf and Charles
Chastain, Much of the material, including the formal system of section XVIII, was
originally presented in a series of lectures at the fabled 1971 Summer Institute in
the Philosophy of Language held at the University of California, Irvine. ( )  1977by David Kaplan.
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Pre face
In about 1966 I wrote a paper about quantification into epistemological
contexts. There are very difficult metaphysical, logical, and epistemo-
logical problems involved in providing a treatment of such idioms which
does not distort our intuitions about their proper use and which is up
to contemporary logical standards. I  d id not then, and do  not now,
regard the treatment I  provided as ful ly adequate. A n d  I  became more
and more intrigued with problems centering on what I would like to call
the semantics o f  direct reference. B y  this I  mean theories o f  meaning
according to which certain singular terms refer directly without the me-
diation of a Fregean Sinn as meaning. I f  there are such terms, then the
proposition expressed by a sentence containing such a term would involve
individuals directly rather than by way of the "individual conepts" or
"manners of presentation" I  had been taught to expect. Le t  us call such
putative singular terms ( i f  there are any) directly referential terms and
such putative propositions (if  there are any) singular propositions. Even
i f  English contained no singular terms whose proper semantics was one
of direct reference, could we determine to introduce such terms? A n d
even i f  we had no directly referential terms and introduced none, is there
a need or use for singular propositions?
The feverish development of quantified modal logics, more generally,
of quantified intensional logics, of the 1960s gave rise to  a metaphysical
and epistemological malaise regarding the problem of identifying individ-
uals across worlds—what, in 1967, I  called the problem of "Trans-World
Heir Lines." This problem was really just the problem of singular propo-
sitions: those which involve individuals directly, rearing its irrepressible
head in the possible-world semantics that  were then (and are now) sopopular.
It was not that according to those semantical theories any sentences
of the languages being studied were themselves taken t o  express sin-
gular propositions, i t  was just that  singular propositions seemed to be
needed in the analysis of the nonsingular propositions expressed by these
sentences. For example, consider
(0) 9 s ( F x  A - O F ) .
This sentence would not be taken by anyone to express a singular propo-
sition., But in order to evaluate the truth-value of the component
DF
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(under some assignment of an individual to the variable 'x ') ,  we must
first determine whether the proposition expressed by its component
F r
while Frege's solution: that  a
, a n d  [ 3  ,  
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g  
t o  
t h e  
s a m
e  
t h i n
g ,
do so by way of different senses, would be blocked. Also: because of the
fact that the component of  the proposition is being determined by the
individual rather than vice versa, we have something like a violation of
the famous Fregean dictum that there is no road back from denotation
to sense [propositional component]. (Recently, I  have come to think that
i f  we countenance singular propositions, a collapse of Frege's intensional
ontology into Russell's takes place.)
I can draw some l i t t le pictures to give you an idea of the two kinds
of semantical theories I  want to contrast.
(under an assignment of an individual to the variable 'x') is a necessary
proposition. So in the course of analyzing (0), we are required to deter-
mine the proposition associated wi th a formula containing a free vari-
able. N o w  free variables under an assignment o f  values are paradigms
of what I  have been calling directly referential terms. I n  determining
a semantical value for a formula containing a free variable we may be
given a  value for  the variable—that is, an individual drawn from the
universe over which the variable is taken to range—but nothing more.
A variable's first and only meaning is its value. Therefore, i f  we are to
associate a proposition (not merely a truth-value) w i th  a formula con-
taining a free variable (with respect to  an assignment of  a value to the
variable), that  proposition seems bound to be singular (even i f  valiant
attempts are made to disguise this fact by using constant functions to
imitate individual concepts). The  point is, that i f  the component of the
proposition (or the step in  the construction o f  the proposition) which
corresvonds t o  the singular term is determined by the individual and
the individual is directly determined by the singular term—rather than
the individual being determined by  the component of  the proposition,
which is directly determined by the singular term—then we have what I
call a singular proposition. [Russell's semantics was like the semantical
theories for quantified intensional logics that I  have described i n  that
although no (closed) sentence o f  Principia Mathernatica was taken to
stand for a singular proposition, singular propositions are the essential
building blocks of all propositions.]
The most important hold-out against semantical theories tha t  re-
quired singular propositions is Alonzo Church, the great modern cham-
pion of  Frege's semantical theories. Church also advocates a version of
quantified intensional logic, but with a subtle difference that finesses the
need for singular propositions. ( I n  Church's logic, given a sentential for-
mula containing free variables and given an assignment of  values to the
variables, no proposition is yet determined. A n  additional assignment
of "senses" t o  the free variables must be made before a proposition can
be associated wi th  the formula.) I t  is no accident that  Church rejects
direct reference semantical theories. F o r  i f  there were singular terms
which referred directly, i t  seems likely that Frege's problem: how can
=  ,  i f  true, differ in  meaning from r
a  =  c e ' ,  c o u l d  
b e  
r e i n s t a t e d ,
c.I''•-c
,,,,,.... ,e, ,.cv -,.. 'q...',,
,,
Q 
-
c
,  
1
"  
•
,
:
.
N
1
Is
,
e
' 
d
c  
Z  
S  
'  
.  
-
'
4
-
°
• c, e.0 4zz
e
' . t , t ' '
a c e  c
,(NS' 4  0
,
- .
C• -
c •  
t
o
'  
C
C 0  4  ( 3  _  p,$• C
,  
0
.
0  
r
e
P
N:
.
" 
0  
•  
0  
'  
e
r
,,, 4. +,e
S. N>o ' ,
'
,
.
5
.
Fregean P i c tu re
LANGUAGE
(singular term) d e n o t e s(This relation is defined
as the product of the other
two relations)
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PROPOSITIONAL COMPONENT
Sense ( a  concept, something
like a description in purely
op q u a l i t a t i v e  language)
2
(This relation is, in general,
empirical; the individual who falls
under the concept, i.e., who, uniquely,
' '  has the qualities)
INDIVIDUAL
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Di rec t  Reference P i c tu re
PROPOSITIONAL COMPONENT
LANGUAGE
(singular term)
(This relation is determined
by the conventions or rules
of the language)
refers
INDIVIDUAL
(These pictures are not entirely accurate for several reasons, among
them; that the contrasting pictures are meant to account for more than
just singular terms and that  the relation marked 'refers'
involve a kind of Fregean sense used to fix the referent.)
I  won't go into the pros and cons o f  these two views at  this time,
Suffice i t  to say that  I  had been raised on Pregean semantics and was
sufficiently devout t o  wonder whether the kind o f  quantification into
modal and epistemic contexts that  seemed to  require singular proposi-
tions really made sense. ( M y  paper "Quantifying In" can be regarded
as an attempt to explain away such idioms for epistemic contexts.)
2 But there were pressures f rom quarters other than quantified in -
tensional logic i n  favor o f  a  semantics o f  direct reference. F i r s t  o f
all there was Donnellan's fascinating paper "Reference and Definite
Descriptions."
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in 1958 in which he argued wi th  respect to certain natural kind terms
like 'tiger' and 'gold', that i f  their Fregean senses were the kind of thing
that one grasped when one understood the terms, then such senses could
may already
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Philosophy of  Language, ed. A,  P. Martinich (Oxford; Oxford University Press,
1985).
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(1966): 281-304; reprinted in Martinich, op. cit.
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not determine the extension of  the terms. A n d  finally Kripke's Prince-
ton lectures o f  spring 1970, later published as Naming and Neeessity,
4were just beginning to  leak out along with their strong attack on the
Fregean theory of proper names and their support of a theory of directreference.
As I  said earlier, I  was intrigued by the semantics o f  direct refer-
ence, so when I had a sabbatical leave for the year 1970-71, I decided to
work in the area in which such a theory seemed most plausible: demon-
stratives. I n  fal l  1970, I  wrote, for a conference a t  Stanford, a  paper
" M i n t . " '  Using Donnellan's ideas as a  starting point, I  tr ied t o  de-
velop the contrast between Fregean semantics and the semantics o f  di-
rect reference, and to argue that demonstratives—although they could
be treated on a  Fregean model—were more interestingly treated on a
direct reference model. Ult imately I came to the conclusion that  some-
thing analogous to Donnellan's referential use o f  a definite description
could be developed using my new demonstrative, "dthat."  In the course
of this paper I groped my way to a formal semantics for demonstratives
rather different in conception from those that had been offered before.
In spring 1971,1 gave a series of lectures at Princeton on the seman-
tics of direct reference. B y  this time I  had seen a transcript o f  Naming
and Necessity and I tried to relate some of my ideas to Kripke's.
6 I  a l s ohad written out the formal semantics for my Logic of  Demonstratives.
That summer at the Irvine Philosophy of Language Institute I  lectured
again on the semantics of  direct reference and repeated some of  these
lectures at  various institutions in fal l  1971. A n d  there the matter has
stood except for a bit  of updating of  the 1971 Logic of Demonstratives
notes in 1973.
I now think that demonstratives can be treated correctly only on a
direct reference model, bu t  that  my earlier lectures a t  Princeton and
Irvine on direct reference semantics were too broad in scope, and that
the most important and certainly the most convincing part of my theory
is just the logic of demonstratives itself. I t  is based on just a few quite
4 Saul Kripke, "Naming and Necessity," i n  Semantics o f  Natural Language,
ed. G. Harman and D. Davidson (Dordrecht; Raids!, 1972); revised edition pub-
lished as a separate monograph, Naming and Necessity (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, •1980). References are to the revised edition.
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Academic Press, 1978); reprinted in Martinich, op. cit.
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familiar with Naming and Necessity, I have enthusiastically adopted the 'analytical
apparatus' and some of the terminology of that, brilliant work.
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simple ideas, but the conceptual apparatus turns out to be surprisingly
rich and interesting. A t  least I hope that you will find it so.
In this work I have concentrated on pedagogy. Philosophically, there
is little here that goes beyond the Summer Institute Lectures, but I have
tried, by limiting the scope, to present the ideas in a more compelling
way. Some new material appears in the two speculative sections: XVII
(Epistemological Remarks) and XX (Adding 'Says'). I t  is my hope that
a theory of demonstratives will give us the tools to go on in a more
sure-footed way to explore the de. re propositional attitudes as well as
other semantical issues.
I .  I n t r oduc t i on
I believe my theory of demonstratives to be uncontrovertable and largely
uncontroversial. This is not a tribute to the power of my theory but a
concession of its obviousness. In the past, no one seems to have followed
these obvious facts out to their obvious consequences. I  do that. What
is original with me is some terminology to help fix ideas when things get
complicated. I t  has been fascinating to see how interesting the obvious
consequences of obvious principles can be.'
Demonstrat ives, Indexicals,  and Pu re  Indexica ls
I tend to describe my theory as 'a theory of demonstratives', but that
is poor usage. I t  stems from the fact that I  began my investigations
by asking what is said when a speaker points at someone and says,
"He is suspicious."' The word 'he', so used, is a demonstrative, and
the accompanying pointing is the requisite associated demonstration. I
hypothesized a certain semantical theory for such demonstratives, and
then I  invented a new demonstrative, 'dthat', and stipulated that its
semantics be in accord with my theory. I  was so delighted with this
methodological sleight of hand for my demonstrative rdthat', that when
I generalized the theory to apply to words like 'I', 'now', 'here', etc.—
words which do not require an associated demonstration—I continued
to call my theory a 'theory of demonstratives' and I  referred to these
words as 'demonstratives'.
That terminological practice conflicts with what I preach, and I will
try to correct it. (But I tend to backslide.)
The group of words for which I propose a semantical theory includes
the pronouns ' I ' ,  'my', 'you', 'he', 'his', 'she', ' i t ' ,  the demonstrative
pronouns 'that', 'this', the adverbs 'here', 'now', 'tomorrow', 'yesterday',
the adjectives 'actual', 'present', and others. These words have uses
other than those in which I  am interested (or, perhaps, depending on
how you individuate words, we should say that they have homonyms in
which I am not interested). For example, the pronouns 'he' and 'his' are
used not as demonstratives but as bound variables in
7
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the correct use of certain words and I propose detailed analyses of certain notions.
I reeognice that these matters may be controversial. I  do not regard them as part
of the basic, obvious, theory.
<See "Dthat," p. 320 in Martinick.
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For what is a man profited, i f  he shall gain
the whole world, and lose his own soul?
What is common to  the words or usages in  which I  am interested
is that  the referent is  dependent on  the context o f  use and tha t  the
meaning of  the word provides a  rule which determines the referent i n
terms of certain aspects o f  the context. The term I  now favor for these
words is 'indexical'. Other authors have used other terms; Russell used
'egocentric particular' and Reichenbach used 'token reflexive'. I  prefer
'indexical' (which, I believe, is due to Pierce) because it seems less theory
laden than the others, and because I regard Russell's and Reichenbach's
theories as defective. , „
Some of the indexicals require, in order to determine their referents,
an associated demonstration: typically, though not invariably, a (visual)
presentation o f  a local object discriminated by a  pointing.
9 T h e s e  i n -dexicals are the true demonstratives, and ' that '  is their paradigm. The
demonstrative (an expression) refers to  that which the demonsiration
demonstrates. I  call that which is demonstrated the 'demonstratum'.
A demonstrative without an associated demonstration is incomplete.
The linguistic rules which govern the use o f  the true demonstratives
'that', 'he', etc., are not sufficient to determine their referent in all con-
texts o f  use. Something else—an associated demonstration—must be
provided, T h e  linguistic rules assume that  such a  demonstration ac-
companies each (demonstrative) use of a demonstrative. A n  incomplete
demonstrative is not vacuous l ike an improper definite description. A
demonstrative can be vacuous in  various cases. F o r  example, when its
associated demonstration has no derrionstratum (a  hallucination)—or
the wrong kind of  demonstratum (pointing to a flower and saying 'he'
in the belief that one is pointing to a man disguised as a f l o w e r
1
° ) — o r
too many demonstrata (pointing to two intertwined vines and saying
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the speaker's part, as when someone shouts "Stop that man" while only one man
is rushing toward the door. My notion of a demonstration is a theoretical concept.
I do not, in the present work, undertake a detailed 'operational' analysis of  this
notion although there are scattered remarks relevant to the issue. I  do consider,
in XVI below, some alternative theoretical treatments of demonstrations.
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be appropriate for flowers, but it is not so in English; (2) that a background story
can be provided that will make pointing at the flower a contextually appropriate,
though deviant, way of referring to a man; for example, i f  we are talking of great
hybridizers; and (3) that i t  is possible to treat the example as a referential use
of the demonstrative 'he' on the model of DonneIlan's referential use of a definite
description (See "Reference and Definite Descriptions"). Under the referential use
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'that vine'). B u t  i t  is clear that  one can distinguish a  demonstrative
with a vacuous demonstration: no  referents from a demonstrative with
no associated demonstration: incomplete.
Al l  this is by way of contrasting true demonstratives with pure index-
icals. Fo r  the latter, no associated demonstration is required, and any
demonstration supplied is either for emphasis or is i r retevant.
11 A m o n gthe pure indexicals are '1', 'now', 'here' ( in one sense), 'tomorrow', and
others. T h e  linguistic rules which govern Their use ful ly determine the
referent for each context."  No  supplementary actions or intentions are
needed. The speaker refers to himself when he uses '1', and no pointing
to another or believing that he is another or intending to refer to anothercan defeat this reference."
Michael Bennett has noted that  some indexicals have both a  pure
and a demonstrative use, 'Here' is a pure indexical in
I am in here
and is a demonstrative in
In two weeks, I  will be here [pointing at a city on a map].
treatment we would assign as referent for 'he' whatever the speaker intended t o
demonstrate, I  intended the example to exemplify a failed demonstration, thus,
a case in which the speaker, falsely believing the flower to be some man or other
in disguise, but having no particular man in mind, and certainly not intending to
refer to anything other than that man, says, pointing at the flower, "He has beenfollowing me around all day."
l l  I have in mind such cases as pointing at oneself while saying ' I '  (emphasis) or
pointing at someone else while saying 'I' (irrelevance or madness or what?).
'There are certain uses of pure indexicals that might be called 'messages recorded
for later broadcast', which exhibit a special uncertainty as to the referent of 'here'
and 'now'. I f  the message: ' ' I  am not here now" is  recorded on a  telephone
answering device, i t  is to be assumed that the time referred to by 'now' is the
time of playback rather than the time of recording. Donnellan has suggested that
if there were typically a significant lag between our production of speech and its
audition (for example, i f  sound traveled very very slowly), our language might
contain two forms of 'now': one for the time of production, another for the time of
audition. The indexicals 'here' and 'now' also suffer from vagueness regarding the
size of the spatial and temporal neighborhoods to which they refer. These facts do
not seem to me to slur the difference between demonstratives and pure indexicals.
130r course i t  is certain intentions on the part of the speaker that make a partic-
ular vocable the first person singular pronoun rather a nickname for Irving. M y
semantical theory is a theory of word meaning, not speaker's meaning. I t  is based
on linguistic rules known, explicitly or implicitly, by all competent users of thelanguage.
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Tw o  Obvious Pr inc ip les
So much for preliminaries. M y  theory is based on two obvious principles.
The first has been noted in every discussion of  the subject.
P r inc ip le  3. The  referent o f  a pure indexical depends on the context,
and the referent of a demonstrative depends on the associated dem-
onstration.
I f  you and I  both say 'I ' we refer to different persons. The demonstratives
'that '  and 'he' can be correctly used to refer to any one of a wide variety
of objects simply by adjusting the accompanying demonstration.
The second obvious principle has less often been formulated explic-
itly.
Pr inc ip le  2 Indexicals, pure and demonstrative alike, are directly ref-erential.
I V.  Remarks  on R i g i d  Designators
In a n
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'rigid designators', and tried to explain that my usage differed from his,
I  m now shying away from that terminology, Bu t  because i t  is so well
known, I  wi l l  make some comments on the notion or notions involved.
The term 'rigid designator' was coined by Saul Kripke to character-
ize those expressions which designate the same thing in every possible
world in which that thing exists and which designate nothing elsewhere.
He uses i t  in  connection wi th his controversial, though, I  believe, cor-
+  rect claim that proper names, as well as many common nouns, are rigid
designators. There is an unfortunate confusion in the idea that a proper
name would designate nothing i f  the bearer o f  the name were not  to
Kripke himself adopts positions which seem inconsistent with
this feature of  rigid designators. I n  arguing that the object designated
by a rigid designator need not  exist in  every possible world, he seems
to assert that under certain circumstances what is expressed by 'Hitler
does not exist' would have been true, and not because 'Hitler' would have
designated nothing ( in that case we might have given the sentence no
truth-value) but  because what 'Hit ler '  would have designated—namely
14
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Approaches to Natural Language, ed. J. Hintikka et al. (Dordrecht: Reidel, 1973),especially appendix X.
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Hitler—would not have existed.
15 F u r t h e r m o r e ,  
i t  
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portant feature of the possible world semantics for quantified intensional
logics, which Kripke did so much to create and popularize, that variables,
those paradigms of  rigid designation, designate the same individual in
all possible worlds whether the individual "exists" or n o t .
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own concept?) a n d  whatever associations or even meaning the phrase
'rigid designator' may have, I  intend to  use 'directly referential' for an
expression whose referent, once determined, is taken as fixed for all pos-
sible circumstances, i.e., is taken as being the propositional component.
For me, the intuit ive idea is not that o f  an expression which turns
out to  designate the same object in  all possible circumstances, but  an
expression whose semantical rules provide directly that  the referent in
all possible circumstances is fixed to be the actual referent. I n  typical
cases the semantical rules will do this only implicitly, by providing a way
of determining the actual referent and no way of determining any other
propositional comp onent.
17 We should beware o f  a certain confusion in interpreting the phrase
'designates the same object in all circumstances'. We do not mean that
the expression could no have been used to designate a different object.
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' T h e  matter is even more complicated, There are two 'definitions' of 'rigid desig-
nator' in Naming and Necessity, pp. 48-49. The first conforms to what seems to
me to have been the intended concept—same designation in all possible worlds—
the second, scarcely a page later, conforms to the more widely held view that a
rigid designator need not designate the object, or any object, at worlds in which
the object does not exist. According to this conception a designator cannot, at
a given world, designate something which does not exist in that world. The  in-
troduction of the notion of a strongly rigid designator—a rigid designator whose
designaturn exists in all possible worlds—suggests that the latter idea was upper-
most in Kripke's mind. (The  second definition is given, unequivocally, on page
146 of "Identity and Necessity," in Identity and Individuation, ed. M,  K. Munitz
(New York: New York University Press, 1971).) I n  spite of the textual evidence,
systematic considerations, including the fact that variables cannot be accounted
for .
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"Here, and in the preceding paragraph, in attempting to convey my notion of a
directly referential singular term, I  slide back and forth between two metaphysical
pictures: tha t  of  possible worlds and that of structured propositions. r t  seems
to me that a truly semantical idea should presuppose neither picture, and be ex-
pressible in terms of either, Kripke's discussion of rigid designators is, I  believe,
distorted by an excessive dependence on the possible worlds picture and the asso-
ciatedsemantical style. For more on the relationship between the two pictures, see
pages 724-25 of my "How to Russell a Frege-Church," The Journal of Philosophy72 (1975): 716-29.
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We mean rather that given a use of  the expression, we may ask of what
has been said whether i t  would have been true or false in various counter-
factual circumstances, and in such counterfactual circumstances, which
are the individuals relevant to determining truth-value. Thus we must
distinguish possible occasions of use—which I call contdxts—from possi-
ble circumstances of evaluation o f  what was said on a given occasion of
use. Possible circumstances of  evaluation I call circumstances or, some-
, t i m e s ,  just  counterfactual situations. A  directly referential term may
designate different objects when used in  different contexts. B u t  when
evaluating what was said in a given context, only a single object wil l  be
relevant to  the evaluation in all circumstances. T h i s  sharp distinction
between contexts o f  use and circumstances o f  evaluation must be kept
in mind i f  we are to avoid a seeming conflict between Principles 1 and
2 .
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the obviousness of both principles (I have not yet argued for Principle 2)
the distinction between contexts of use and circumstances of  evaluation
is forced upon us.
I f  I may wax metaphysical in order to fix an image, let us think of the
vehicles of evaluation—the what-is-said in a given context—as proposi-
tions: Don ' t  think of  propositions as sets of possible worlds, but rather
as structured entities looking something like the sentences which express
them. For each occurrence of a singular term in a sentence there will be a
corresponding constituent in the proposition expressed. The constituent
of the proposition determines, for each circumstance o f  evaluation, the
object relevant to  evaluating the proposition in that  circumstance. I n
general, the constituent of the proposition will be some sort of complex,
constructed from various attributes by logical composition. B u t  in the
case of  a singular term which is directly referential, the constituent o f
.1 t h e  prOposition is just the object itself. Thus i t  is that i t  does not just
turn out that  the constituent determines the same object in every cir-
cumstance, the constituent (corresponding to a rigid designator) just is
the object. There is no determining to do at all. On  this picture—and
this is really a picture and not a theory—the definite description
(1) T h e  n[(Snow is slight A n
2
= 9 )  V  ( —
S n o w  
i s  
s l i g h t  
A
2' = n + 1 ) ]
1 9
' I  think i t  likely that i t  was just the failure to notice this distinction that led to
a failure to recognize Principle 2. Some of the history and consequences of the
conflation of Context and Circumstance is discussed in section VII.
' I  would have used 'snow is white', but I wanted a contingent clause, and so many
would yield a constituent which is complex although i t  would determine
the same object in  all circumstances, Thus,  (1), though a  rigid desig-
nator, is not directly referential from this (metaphysical) point of view.
Note, however, that  every proposition which contains the complex ex-
pressed by (1) is equivalent to some singular proposition which contains
just the number three itself as constituent.
2
°
The semantical feature that I  wish to highlight in calling an expres-
sion directly referential is not the fact that it designates the same object
in every circumstance, but  the way in which i t  designates an object in
any circumstance, Such  an expression is a  device o f  direct reference,
This does not imply that i t  has no conventionally fixed semantical rules
which determine its referent in  each context of use; quite the opposite.
There are semantical rules which determine the referent i n  each con-
text of  use—but that is all. The rules do not provide a complex which
together with a circumstance o f  evaluation yields an object. T h e y  justprovide an object,
I f  we keep in mind our sharp distinction between contexts of use and
circumstances o f  evaluation, we wi l l  not be tempted to  confuse a rule
which assigns an object to each context with a 'complex' which assigns
an object to each circumstance. For example, each context has an agent
(loosely, a speaker). Thus an appropriate designation rule for a directlyreferential term would be;
(2) I n  each possible context o f  use the given term refers to  the
agent of the context.
But this rule could not be used to assign a relevant object to  each cir-
cumstance of evaluation. Circumstances of evaluation do not, in general,have agents. Suppose I  say,
(3) I  do not exist.
Under what circumstances would what I  said be true? I t  would be true
in circumstances in  which I  did not exist. Among  such circumstances
are those in which no one, and thus, no speakers, no agents exist. To
search a circumstance of evaluation for a speaker in order to (mis)applyrule (2) would be to go off on an irrelevant chase.
people (possibly including me) nowadays seem to have views which allow that'snow is white' may be necessary,
" I  am ignoring propositions expressed by sentences containing episternic Operators
or others for which equivalence is not a  sufficient condition for interchange ofoperand,
1
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Three paragraphs ago I sketched a metaphysical picture of the struc-
ture o f  a proposition. T h e  picture is taken from the semantical parts
of Russell's Principles o f  Mathemalics.
21 T w o  y e a r s  
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not a part of my theory, but i t  well conveys my conception of a directly
refer ntial expression and of the semantics of direct reference. (The pic-
ture needs some modification in order to avoid difficulties which Russell
later noted—though he attributed them to Frege's theory rather than
his own earlier theory. )
23 I f  we adopt a possible worlds semantics, all directly referential terms
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Consider the proposition expressed by the sentence, 'The centre of mass of the
Solar System is a point'. Cal l  the proposition, 'P'. P  has in its subject place a
certain complex, expressed by the definite description. Call the complex, 'Plexy'.
We can describe P/exy as "the complex expressed by 'the center of mass of the
solar system'." Can we produce a directly referential term which designates Plexy?
Leaving aside for the moment the controversial question of whether 'Plexy' is such
a term, let us imagine, as Russell believed, that we can directly refer to Plexy
by affixing a kind of meaninp marks (on the analogy of quotation marks) to the
description itself. N o w  consider the sentence ' " t he  center of mass of the solar
system"' is a point'. Because the subject of this sentence is directly referential
and refers to Flexy, the proposition the sentence expresses will have as its subject
constituent Plexy itself. A moment's reflection will reveal that this proposition is
simply P again. But  this is absurd since the two sentences speak about radically
different objects.
(I believe the foregoing argument lies behind some of the largely incomprehensi-
ble arguments mounted by Russell against Frege in "On Denoting," though there
are certainly other difficulties in that argument. I t  is not surprising that Russell
there confused Frege's theory with his own of Principle o f  Malheanatics. T h e
first footnote of "On Denoting" asserts that the two theories are "very nearly the
same.")
The solution to the difficulty is simple, Regard the 'object' places of a singular
proposition as marked by some operation which cannot mark a complex. (There
always will be some such operation.) For  example, suppose that no complex is
(represented by) a set containing a single member. Then we need only add t o
mark the places in a singular proposition which correspond to directly referential
terms. We no longer need worry about confusing a complex with a propositional
constituent corresponding to a  directly referring term because no complex wi l l
have the form -(x). I n  particular, Flexy { F l e x y l .  This  technique can also be
used to resolve another confusion in Russell. He argued that a sentence containing
a nondenoting directly referential term (he would have called i t  a nondenoting
'logically proper name') would be meaningless, presumably because the purported
singular proposition would be incomplete. But the braces themselves can fill out
the singular proposition, and i f  they contain nothing, no more anomalies need
result than what, the development of Free Logic has already inured us to.
will be regarded as rigid designators in the modified sense o f  an expres-
sion which designates the same thing in al l  possible worlds (irrespective
of whether the thing exists in the possible world or no t ) . "  However, as
already noted, I do not regard all rigid designators—not even all strongly
rigid designators (those that designate something that exists in all pos-
sible worlds) or all rigid designators in the modified sense—as directly
referential. I  believe that proper names, like variables, are directly ref-
erential. T h e y  are not, in  general, strongly r igid designators nor are
they r igid designators in the original sense.
25 W h a t  i s  
c h a r a c t e r i s t i c  
o f
directly referential terms is that the designatum (referent) determines
the propositional component rather than the propositional component,
along wi th a circumstance, determining the designatum. I t  is for this
reason that a directly referential term that designates a contingently ex-
isting object wi l l  sti l l  be a rigid designator in the modified sense. T h e
propositional component need not choose its designatum from those of-
fered by a passing circumstance; i t  has already secured i ts  designatum
before the encounter with the circumstance.
When we think in terms of possible world semantics this fundamental
distinction becomes subliminal. This is because the style of the seman-
tical rules obscures the distinction and makes i t  appear tha t  directly
referential terms differ from ordinary definite descriptions only in that
the propositional component in the former case must be a constant func-
tion of circumstances. I n  actual fact, the referent, in a circumstance, of
a directly referential term is simply independent of the circumstance and
is no more a function (constant or otherwise) of  circumstance, than my
action is a function of  your desires when I  decide to do i t  whether you
like i t  or not. The  distinction that is obscured by the style of  possible
world semantics is dramatized by the structured propositions picture.
That is part of  the reason why I  like it.
Some directly referential terms, like proper names, may have no se- k-
mantically relevant descriptive meaning, or at least none that is specific:1
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icals, may have a limited kind o f  specific descriptive meaning relevant
to the features o f  a context o f  use. S t i l l  others, like 'clthat' terms (see
below), may be associated with full-blown Fregean senses used to fix the
referent. Bu t  in any case, the descriptive meaning of a directly referen-
tial term is no part of  the propositional content.
24 This is the first sense of footnote 16.
"Th i s  is the second sense of footnote 16.
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V.  A r g u m e n t  fo r  P r inc ip le  2: P u r e  Indexicals
As stated earlier, I  believe this principle is uncontroversial, B u t  I  had
best distinguish it from similar principles which are false. I  am not claim-
ing, as has been claimed for proper names, that indexicals lack anything
that might be called 'descriptive meaning'. Indexicals, in general, have
a rather easily statable descriptive meaning. B u t  i t  is clear that  this
meaning is relevant only to determining a referent in  a  context o f  use
and not to determining a relevant individual in a circumstance of evalu-
ation. Let us return to the example in connection with the sentence (3)
and the indexical 'P. The bizarre result of taking the descriptive mean-
ing o f  the indexical to be the propositional constituent is that what I
said in uttering (3) would be true in a circumstance of evaluation i f  and
only i f  the speaker (assuming there is one) o f  the circumstance does not
exist in the circumstance. Nonsense! I f  that were the correct analysis,
what I  said could not be true. From which i t  follows that
I t  is impossible that I  do not exist.
Here is another example to  show that  the descriptive meaning o f  an
indexical may be entirely inapplicable in the circumstance of evaluation.
When I  say,
I wish I  were not speaking now.
The circumstances desired do not  involve contexts o f  use and agents
who are not speaking. T h e  actual context of  use is used to  determine
the relevant individual: me—and time: now—and then we query the
various circumstances of  evaluation with respect to  that individual and
that t ime.
Here is another example, not of the inapplicability of the descriptive
meaning to circumstances but of  its irrelevance. Suppose I say at to, " I t
will soon be the case that al l  that is now beautiful is faded." Consider
what was said in the subsentence,
Al l  that is now beautiful is faded.
I wish to evaluate that content at some near future time t
l
.  W h a t  i s  t h e
relevant time associated with the indexical 'now'? Is i t  the future time
t l? No, i t  is t
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See how rigidly the indexicals cling to the referent determined in the
context of  use:
(4) I t  is possible that in Pakistan, in five years, only those who
are actually here now are envied.
The point of (4) is that the circumstance, place, and time referred to by
the indexicals 'actually', 'here', and 'now' are the circumstance, place,
and time of the context, not a circumstance, place, and time determined
by the modal, locational, and temporal operators wi th in whose scope
the indexicals lie.
I t  may be objected that this only shows that indexicals always take
primary scope (in the sense of Russell's scope of a definite description).
This objection attempts to relegate a l l  direct reference to  impl ic i t  use
of the paradigm of the semantics of direct reference, the variable, Thus
(4) is transformed into,
The actual circumstances, here, and now are such that  i t  is
possible that in Pakistan in five years only those who, in the
first, are located at the second, during the third, are envied.
Although this may not be the most felicitous form of expression, its
meaning and, in  particular, its symbolization should be clear to  those
familiar with quantified intensional logics. The pronouns, 'the first', 'the
second', and 'the third' are to be represented by distinct variables bound
to existential quantifiers at the beginning and identified with 'the actual
circumstance', 'here', and 'now' respectively.
(
5
)
(3w)(3p)(3t)[w=the actual circumstance A p=here A t=now
A 0  In Pakistan In five years Vx(x is envied --, s  is located
at p during i n  w)]
But, such transformations, when thought of  as representing the claim
that indexicals take primary scope, do  not  provide an alternative t o
Principle 2, since we may still ask of an utterance of (5) in a context c,
when evaluating it with respect to an arbitrary circumstance, to what do
the indexicals 'actual', 'here', and 'now' refer, The answer, as always, is:
the relevant features of the context e. [ In fact, although (4) is equivalent
to (5), neither indexicals nor quantification across intensional operators
is dispensable in favor of the other.]
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Perhaps enough has been said to establish the following.
( T i )  The descriptive meaning o f  a pure indexical determines the
referent o f  the indexical with respect to a context o f  use but
is either inapplicable or  irrelevant to determining a referent
with respect to a circumstance o f  evaluation.
I hope that your intuition wil l  agree with mine that i t  is for this reasonthat:
(T2) When what was said in using a pure indexical in a context a
is to be evaluated with respect to an arbitrary circumstance,
the relevant object is always the referent of the indexical with
respect to the context a.
This is just a slightly elaborated version of Principle 2.
Before turning to true demonstratives, we wil l  adopt some terminol-ogy.
V I .  Termino log ica l  Remarks
'Principle 1 and Principle 2 taken together imply that sentences contain-
ing pure indexicals have two kinds of meaning.
V I .  ( i )  C o n t e n t  and C i rcumstance
What is said i n  using a  given indexical in  different contexts may be
different. Thus i f  I say, today,
I was insulted yesterday
and you utter the same words tomorrow, what is said is different. I f
what we say differs in truth-value, that is enough to show that we say
different things. B u t  even i f  the truth-values were the same, i t  is clear
that there are possible circumstances in which what I said would be true
but what you said would be false. Thus we say different things.
Let us call this first kind o f  meaning—what is said—content. T h e
content o f  a sentence in a given context is what has traditionally been
called a proposition. Strawson, in noting that the sentence
The present king of France is bald
could be used on different occasions to make different statements, used
'statement' in a way similar to our use of  content o f  a sentence. I f  we
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wish to  express the same content in different contexts, we may have to
change indexicals. Frege, here using 'thought' for content o f  a sentence,expresses the point well.
I f  someone wants to  say the same today as he expressed
yesterday using the word 'today', he must replace this word
with 'yesterday'. Although the thought is the same its verbal
expression must be different so that the sense, which would
otherwise be affected by the differing times o f  utterance, isreadjusted.
26
I take content as a notion applying not only to sentences taken in a
context but to any meaningful part of  speech taken in a context. Thus
we can speak o f  the content o f  a definite description, an indexical, a
predicate, etc. I t  is contents tha t  are evaluated i n  circumstances o f
evaluation. I f  the content is a proposition (i.e., the content of a sentence
taken in some context), the result of the evaluation will be a truth-value.
The result of evaluating the content of a singular term at a circumstance
will be an object (what I earlier called 'the relevant object'). I n  general,
the result o f  evaluating the content o f  a well-formed expression a  at  a
circumstance wil l  be an appropriate extension for a (i.e., for a sentence,
a truth-values for a term, an individual; for an n-place predicate, a set
of n-tuples of individuals, etc.). Th i s  suggests that we can represent a
26 From "The Thought: A Logical Inquiry," Mind 65 (1956): 289-311. I f  Frege had
only supplemented these comments with the observation that indexicals are de-
vices of direct reference, the whole theory of indexicals would have been his. But
his theory of meaning blinded him to this obvious point, Frege, I  believe, mixed
together the two kinds of meaning in what he called Sinn. A  tholight is, for him,
the Sinn of a sentence, or perhaps we should say a complete sentence. Sinn is to
contain both "the manner and context of presentation [of the denotation]," accord-
ing to "Clber Sinn und Bedeutung" (Zeitschrift f i r  Philosophic end philosophische
Erit ik 100 (1892); trans. as "On Sense and Nominatum," in Contemporary Read-
ings in Logical Theory, ed. Copi and Gould (Macmillan, 1967); mistrans. as "On
Sense and Meaning," in Martinich, op. cit.). Sinn is first introduced to represent
the cognitive significance of a sign, and thus to solve Frege's problem: how can
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taken to represent the truth-conditions or content ( in our sense). Frege felt the
pull of the two notions, which he reflects in some tortured passages about ' I '  in
"The Thought" (quoted below in XVII). I f  one says "Today is beautiful" on Tues-
day and "Yesterday was beautiful" on Wednesday, one expresses the same thought
according to the passage quoted. Ye t  one can clearly lose track of the days and
not realize one is expressing the same thought. I t  seems then that thoughts are
not appropriate bearers of cognitive significance. I  return to this topic in )0/1I.
A detailed examination of Frege on demonstratives is contained in John Perry's
"Frege on Demonstratives," Philosophical Review 86 (1977): 474-97.
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content by a function from circumstances of evaluation to an appropriate
extension. Carnap called such functions intension&
The representation is  a  handy one and I  w i l l  often speak o f  con-
tents in terms of it, but one should note that contents which are distinct
but equivalent (i.e., share a value in all circumstances) are represented
by the same intension, Among other things, this results in the loss of
my distinction between terms which are devices of  direct reference and
descriptions which turn out to  be r igid designators. (Recal l  the meta-
physical paragraph o f  section IV.)  I  wanted the content o f  an indexical
to be just the referent itself, but the intension of such a content wi l l  be
a constant function. I lse of representing intentions does not mean I  am
abandoning that idea—just ignoring i t  temporarily.
A fixed content is  one represented by  a constant function. A l l  di-
rectly referential expressions (as well as al l  r igid designators) have a
fixed content. [What  I  elsewhere call a stable content.1
Let us settle on circumstances for  possible circumstances o f  evalu-
ation. B y  this I  mean both actual and counterfactual situations wi th
respect t o  which i t  is appropriate to  ask for the extensions o f  a given
well-formed expression. A  circumstance wi l l  usually include a possible
state or history of the world, a time, and perhaps other features as well.
The amount of information we require from a circumstance is linked to
the degree o f  specificity o f  contents, and thus to the kinds of operators
in the language,
Operators o f  the famil iar kind treated in  intensional logic (modal,
temporal, etc.) operate on contents. (Since we represent contents by
intensions, i t  is  not  surprising tha t  intensional operators operate on
contents.) T h u s  an appropriate extension for an intensional operator
is a function from intensions to extensions.
27 A  m o d a l  
o p e r a t o r  
w h e n
applied to an intension wi l l  look a t  the behavior of  the intension with
respect t o  the possible state o f  the world feature o f  the circumstances
of evaluation. A  temporal operator wi l l ,  similarly, be concerned wi th
27 As we shall see, indexical operators such as I t  is now the case that," " I t  is actually
the case that,"  and "dthat" ( the last takes a term rather than a sentence as
argument) are also intensional operators. They differ from the familiar operators
in only two ways; first, their extension (the function from intensions to extensions)
depends on context, and second, they are directly referential (thus they have a fixed
content). I  shall argue below (in section VII: Monsters) that all operators that can
be given an English reading are a t  most' intensional. Note that when discussing
issues in terms of the formal representations of the model-theoretic semantics, I
tend to speak in terms of intensions and intensional operators rather than contents
and content operators,
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the t ime of  the circumstance, I f  we bu i l t  the t ime o f  evaluation into
the contents (thus removing time from the circumstances leaving only,
say, a possible world history, and making contents specific as to time),
i t  would make no sense to have temporal operators, To  put  the point
another way, i f  what is said is thought of  as incorporating reference to
a specific time, o r  state o f  the world, or  whatever, i t  is otiose to  ask
whether what is said would have been true at another time, in  another
state o f  the world, or whatever. Temporal operators applied to eternal
sentences (those whose contents incorporate a specific t ime o f  evalua-
tion) are redundant. A n y  intensional operators applied to perfect sen-
tences (those whose contents incorporate specific values for al l  features
of circumstances) are redundant.
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building the time of evaluation into contents, or making contents specific as to
time, or taking what is said to incorporate reference to a specific time, what I
have in mind is this. Given a sentence S: ' I  am writing', in the present context
c, which of the following should we take as the content: ( i )  the proposition that
David Kaplan is writing at IO A.M. on 3/26/77, or (ii) the 'proposition' that David
Kaplan is writing? The proposition (i) is specific as to time, the 'proposition' (ii)
ithe scare quotes reflect my feeling that this is not the traditional notion of a
proposition] is neutral with respect to time. I f  we take the content of S in c to be
(ii), we can ask whether it would be true at times other than the time of c. Thus
we think of the temporally neutral 'proposition' as changing its truth-value over
time. Note that i t  is not just the noneternal sentence S that changes its truth-
value over time, but the 'proposition' itself. Since the sentence S  contains an
indexical 'I', it will express different 'propositions' in different contexts, But since
S contains no temporal indexical, the time of the context will not influence the
'proposition' expressed. An alternative land more traditional] view is to say that
the verb tense in S involves an implicit temporal indexical, so that S is understood
as synonymous with S': ' I  am writing now'. I f  we take this point of view we will
take the content of S in c to be (i). In  this case what is said is eternal; it does not
change its truth-value over time, although S will express different propositions atdifferent times.
There are both technical and philosophical issues involved in choosing between
(i) and (ii). Philosophically, we may ask why the temporal indexical should be
taken to be implicit (making the proposition eternal) when no modal indexical
is taken to be implicit. A f t e r  all, we coithi understand S as synonymous with
S": ' I  am actually writing now', The  content of S" in c is not only eternal, i t
is perfect, I ts  truth changes neither through time nor possibility. Is  there some
good philosophical reason for preferring contents which are neutral with respect
to possibility but draw fixed values frota the context for all other features of a
possible circumstance whether or not the sentence contains an explicit indexical?
(It may be that the traditional view was abetted by one of the delightful anomalies
of the logic of indexicals, namely that S, S', and S" are all logically equivalent!
See Remark 3, p. 547.) Technically, we must note that intensional operators must,
i f  they are not to be vacuous, operate on contents which are neutral with respect
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What sorts o f  intensional operators to  admit  seems to  me largely
a matter o f  language engineering. I t  is a question o f  which features o f
what we intuitively think of as possible circumstances can be sufficiently
well defined and isolated. I f  we wish to isolate location and regard i t  as a
feature of possible circumstances we can introduce locational operators:
'Two miles north i t  is the case that', etc. Such operators can be iterated
and can be mixed with modal and temporal operators. However, to make
such operators interesting we must have contents which are locationally
neutral. Tha t  is, i t  must be appropriate to ask i f  what is said would be
true in  Pakistan. (For  example, ' I t  is raining' seems to  be locationally
as well as temporally and modally neutral.)
This functional notion of the content of a sentence in a context may
not, because of the neutrality of content with respect to  time and place,
say, exactly correspond to the classical conception of a proposition. Bu t
the classical conception can be introduced by adding the demonstratives
'now' and 'here' to  the sentence and taking the content o f  the result.
I w i l l  continue to  refer t o  the content o f  a sentence as a proposition,
ignoring the classical use.
Before leaving the subject o f  circumstances o f  evaluation I  should,
perhaps, note that the mere attempt to show that an expression is di-
rectly referential requires that  i t  be meaningful to ask of  an individual
in one circumstance whether and with what properties i t  exists in an-
other circumstance. I f  such questions cannot be raised because they are
regarded as metaphysically meaningless, the question of  whether a par-
ticular expression is directly referential (or even, a rigid designator) can-
not be raised. I  have elsewhere referred to the view that such questions
are meaningful as haecceitism, and I  have described other metaphysical
manifestations of this v i e w,
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to the feature of circumstance the operator is interested in. Thus, for example, i f
we take the content of S to be (i), the application of a temporal operator to such
a content would have no effect; the operator would be vacuous. Furthermore, i f
we do not wish the iteration of such operators to be vacuous, the content of the
compound sentence containing the Operator must again be neutral with respect
to the relevant feature of circumstance. This is not to say that no such operator
cart have the effect of  fixing the relevant feature and thus, in effect, rendering
subsequent operations vacuous; indexical operators do just this. I t  is just that
this must not be the general situation. A content must be the kind of entity that
is subject to modification in the feature relevant to the operator. [The textual
material to which this note is appended is too cryptic and should be rewritten.)
29 "How to Russell a Prege-Church." The pronunciation is: "Hefo-ee-i-tis-m." The
epithet was suggested by Robert Adams. I t  is not an accident that i t  is derived
from a demonstrative.
uncomfortable with some of its seeming consequences (for example, that
the world might be in a state qualitatively exactly as i t  is, but  with a
permutation of individuals).
It is hard to see how one could think about the semantics of indexicals
and modality without adopting such a view.
V I .  ( i i )  Charac te r
The second kind of meaning, most prominent in the case of  indexicals,
is that which determines the content in varying contexts. The  rule,
'I' refers to the speaker or writer
is a meaning rule of the second kind. The phrase 'the speaker or writer'
is not supposed to be a complete description, nor i t  is supposed to refer
to the speaker or writer of the word T  (There are many such.) I t  refers
to the speaker or writer of  the relevant occurrence of  the word ' I ' ,  that
is, the agent of the context.
Unfortunately, as usually stated, these meaning rules are incomplete
in that they do not explicitly specify that the indexical is directly refer-
ential, and thus do not completely determine the content in each context.
I wi l l  return to this later.
Let us call the second kind of meaning, character. The character o f
an expression is set by linguistic conventions and, in turn, determines the
content of the expression in every context .
30 B e c a u s e  
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is set by linguistic conventions, i t  is natural to think of it as meaning in
the sense of what is known by the competent language user.
Just as i t  was convenient t o  represent contents by  functions from
possible circumstances to extensions (Carnap's intentions), so i t  is con-
venient t o  represent characters by functions from possible contexts to
contents. ( A s  before we have the drawback that equivalent characters
are ident i f ied.
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another context, you can decide whether the contents are the same. I  may twice
use 'here' on separate occasions and not recognize that the place is the same, or
twice hear ' I '  and not know i f  the content is the same. What  I  do know is this:
if it was the same person speaking, then the content was the same. [More on this
epistemological stuff later.]
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to see whether the revisions in Fregean semantical theory, which seem plainly
required to accommodate indexicals (this is the 'obviousness' of my theory), can
throw any light on it. Here we assume that aside from indexicals, Frege's theory
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Character: Contexts C o n t e n t s
Content: Ci rcumstances E x t e n s i o n s
or, in  more familiar language,
Meaning +  Context I n t e n s i o n
Intension +  Possible World E x t e n s i o n
Indexicals have a context-sensztive character. I t  is characteristic o f
an indexical that  its content varies wi th  context. Nonindexicals have
a fixed character. T h e  same content is invoked in a l l  contexts. T h i s
content w i l l  typically be sensitive t o  circumstances, t h a t  is, the non-
indexicals are typically not rigid designators but wil l  vary in extension
from circumstance to circumstance. Eternal sentences are generally good
examples of expressions with a fixed character.
Al l  persons alive in 1977 wil l  have died by 2077
expresses the same proposition no matter when said, by whom, or under
what circumstances. The  truth-value of that proposition may, of course,
vary with possible circumstances, but  the character is fixed. Sentences
with fixed character are very useful to those wishing to leave historical
records.
Now tha t  we have two kinds o f  meaning in addition to extension,
Frege's principle of intensional interchange' becomes two principles;
is correct, roughly, that words and phrases have a kind of descriptive meaning or
sense which at one and the same time constitutes their cognitive significance and
their conditions of applicability.
Kripke says repeatedly in Naming and Necessity that  he is only providing a
picture of how proper names refer and that he does not have an exact theory.
His picture yields some startling results. I n  the case of indexicals we do have a
rather precise theory, which avoids the difficulty of specifying a chain of corrununi-
cation and which yields many analogous results. In facing the vastly more difficult
problems associated with a theory of reference for proper names, the theory of
indexicals may prove useful; if only to show—as I believe—that proper names are
not indexiceds and have no meaning in the sense in which indexicals have mean-
ing (namely a 'cognitive content' which fixes the references in all contexts). [The
issues that arise, involving token reflexives, homonymous words with distinct char-
acter, and homonymous token reflexives with the same character are best saved
for later—much later.]
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Chicago Press, 1947).
(F1) The  character o f  the whole is a function of the character of
the parts. Tha t  is, i f  two compound well-formed expressions
differ only with respect t o  components which have the same
Character, then the Character of the compounds is the same.
(F2) T h e  Content of the whole is a function of the Content of the
parts. T h a t  is, i f  two compound well-formed expressions,
each set in (possibly different) contexts differ only w i th  re-
spect t o  components which wizen taken i n  the i r  respective
contexts have the same content, then the content of  the two
compounds each taken in its own context is the same.
I t  is the second principle that  accounts for the often noted fact that
speakers in different contexts can say the same thing by switching in-
dexical& (And  indeed they often must switch indexicals to do so.) Frege
illustrated this point w i th  respect t o  ' today' and 'yesterday' in  "The
Thought." (But  note that his treatment of 'I' suggests that he does not
believe that utterances of  a n d  'you' could be similarly related!)
Earlier, in my metaphysical phase, I  suggested that we should think
of the content o f  an indexical as being just the referent itself, and I  re-
sented the fact that the representation of contents as intensions forced us
to regard such contents as constant functions. A  similar remark applies
here. I f  we are not overly concerned wi th standardized representations
(which certainly have their value for model-theoretic investigations) we
might be inclined to say that the character of  an indexical-free word or
phrase just is its (constant) content.
V I I ,  Ear l i e r  A t t emp ts :  I n d e x  Theory
The following picture seems to  emerge. The  meaning (character) o f  an
indexical is a function from contexts to extensions (substituting for fixed
contents). The meaning (content, substituting for fixed characters) o f  a
nonindexical is a function from circumstances to extensions. From this
point of  view i t  may appear that the addition of indexicals requires no
new logic, no sharp distinction between contexts and circumstances, just
the addition of some special new features ('contextual' features) to  the
circumstances o f  evaluation. (For  example, an agent t o  provide an in-
terpretation for T. )  Thus an enlarged view of intension is derived. The
intension o f  an expression is a function from certain factors to the ex-
tension of the expression (with respect to those factors). Originally such
factors were simply possible states o f  the world, but  as i t  was noticed
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that the so-called tense operators exhibited a  structure highly analo-
gous to that  o f  the modal operators the factors with respect to  which
an extension was to be determined were enlarged to  include moments
of time. When  i t  was noticed that  contextual factors were required to
determine the extension of sentences containing indexicals, a still more
general notion was developed and called an "index." The extension of an
expression was to be determined with respect to an index. The intension
of an expression was that function which assigned to  every index, the
extension at that index.
The above example supplies us with a statement whose truth-
value is  not  constant b u t  varies as a  function o f  i  E
This situation is easily appreciated in the context o f  time-
dependent statements; that  is, in the case where I  represents
the instant of time. Obviously the same statement can be
true at one moment and false at another. For  more general
situations one must not  th ink of  the i  E  I  as anything as
simple as instants of time or even possible worlds. In  general
we wil l  have
i =  (up,t,p, a,. . . )
where the index i  has many coordinates: for example, w is a
world, t  is a time, p =  (x, y,z) is a (3-dimensional) position
in the world, a is an agent, etc. A l l  these coordinates can
be varied, possibly independently, and thus affect the truth-
values of  statements which have indirect references to  these
coordinates. [From the Advice of  a prominent logician.]
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(in every 'structure'), and 0 0  was taken to be true a t  a  given index
(in a  given structure) jus t  in  case 0  was true a t  every index ( in that
structure). Thus  the familiar principle of modal generalization: i f  k  0,
then 0 0 ,  is validated.
This view, in its treatment of indexicals, was technically wrong and,
more importantly, conceptually misguided.
Consider the sentence
(6) I  am here now.
It is obvious that for many choices o f  index—i.e., for many quadruples
(w, x,p, t)  where w is a possible world history, x is a person, p is a place,
Demonstratives 5 0 9
and t  is a time—(6) wil l  be false. I n  fact, (6) is true only wi th  respect
to those indices (w, x,p,t)  which are such that  in the world history w,
x is located at p at  the time t. Thus (6) fares about on a par with
(7) D a v i d  Kaplan is in Portland on 26 March 1977.
(7) is empirical, and so is (6).
But here we have missed something essential to  our understanding
of indexical& Intu i t ive ly,  (6)  is deeply, and in  some sense, which we
will shortly make precise, universally, true. One need only understand
the meaning of (6) to know that i t  cannot be uttered falsely. N o  such
guarantees apply to (7). A  Logic of Indexicals which does not reflect this
intuitive difference between (6) and (7) has bypassed something essentialto the logic of indexical&
What has gone wrong? W e  have ignored the special relationship
between T ,  'here', and 'now'. Here is a proposed correction. L e t  the
class of  indices be narrowed to include only the proper ones—namely,
those (w, x, p, t) such that in the world w,x  is located at p at the time t.
Such a move may have been intended originally since improper indices
are like impossible worlds; no such contexts could exist and thus there
is no interest in evaluating the extensions of expressions wi th  respect to
them. Our reform has the consequence that (6) comes out, correctly, tobe logically true. Now consider
(8) 0  I  am here now.
Since the contained sentence (namely (6)) is true at every proper index,
(8) also is true at every proper index and thus also is logically true. (As
would be expected by the aforementioned principle of modal generaliza-tion.)
But (8) should not be logically true, since i t  is false, I t  is certainly
not necessary that I  be here now. Bu t  for several contingencies, I  would
be working in my garden now, or even delivering this paper in a locationoutside o f  Portland.
The difficulty, here, is the attempt to assimilate the role of a context
to that of a circumstance. The indices (w, x,p,t) that represent contexts
must be proper in order that (6) be a truth of the logic of indexicals, but
the indices that represent circumstances must include improper ones in
order that  (8) not be a logical truth.
I f  one wishes to  stay wi th  this sort o f  index theory and blur the
conceptual difference between context and circumstance, the  minimal
requirement is a system of  double indexing, one index for context and
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another for circumstance. I t  is surprising, looking back, that  we (for I
was among the early index theorists) did not immediately see that double
indexing was required, for in 1967, at UCLA, Hans Kamp had reported
his work on ' n o w ' "  in  which he had shown that  double indexing was
required to properly accommodate temporal indexicals along with the
usual temporal operators. B u t  i t  was four years before i t  was realized
that this was a general requirement for (and, in  a sense, the key to) a
logic of indexicals.
However, mere double indexing, without a clear conceptual under-
standing of  what each index stands for, is stil l not enough to avoid all
pitfalls.
V I I I .  Mons ters  Begat b y  Elegance
My liberality with respect to operators on content, i.e., intensional op-
erators (any feature of the circumstances of evaluation that can be well
defined and isolated) does not  extend t o  operators which attempt t o
operate on character. Are  there such operators as 'In some contexts i t  is
true that', which when prefixed to  a sentence yields a truth i f  and only
i f  in some context the contained sentence (not the content expressed by
it) expresses a content that is true in the circumstances of that context?
Let us try it:
(9) J o  some contexts i t  is true that I  am not tired now.
For (9) to  be true in the present context i t  suffices that  some agent of
some context not be tired at the time of that context. (0), so interpreted,
has nothing to do wi th me or the present moment. B u t  this violates
Principle 2! Principle 2 can also be expressed in more theory laden way
by saying that indexicals always take primary scope. I f  this is true—and
it  is—then no operator can control the character of the indexicals within
its scope, because they wil l  simply leap out of its scope to the front of
the operator. I  am not saying we could not construct a language with
such operators, just that English is not one . '  And  such operators could
\ not be added to i t .
There is a way to control an indexical, to keep i t  from taking primary
scope, and even to refer i t  to another context (this amounts to changing
its character). Use quotation marks. I f  we mention the indexical rather
3 3
P
u b
l i
s h
e d  
i
n  
1
9
7
1  
a
s  
"
F
o
r
m
a
l  
P
r
o
p
e
r
t
i
e
s  
o
f  
'
N
o
w
'
,
"  
T
h
e
a
r
i
a
.
'Thomason alleges a counterinstance: 'Never put off until tomorrow what you can
do today'. What should one say about this?
than use i t ,  we can, o f  course, operate directly on i t .  C a r n a p  once
pointed ou t  t o  me how important the difference between direct and
indirect quotation is in
Otto said " I  am a fool."
Otto said that I  am a fool.
Operators like 'In some contexts it is true that', which attempt to meddle
with character, I  call monsters. I  claim that none can be expressed in
English (without sneaking in a  quotation device). I f  they stay in the
metalanguage and confine their attention to sentences as in
In some contexts " I  am not tired now" is true
they are rendered harmless and can even do socially useful work (as
does, ' is valid' {see below)).
I have gone on at perhaps excessive length about monsters because
they have recently been begat by  elegance. I n  a  specific application
of the theory o f  indexicals there wi l l  be just certain salient features o f
a circumstance o f  evaluation. S o  we may represent circumstances by
indexed sets o f  features. Th is  is typical of the model-theoretic way. As
already indicated, a l l  the features o f  a circumstance wi l l  generally be
required as aspects of a context, and the aspects of a context may all be
features of  a circumstance. I f  not, a  l i tt le ingenuity may make i t  s o .
3 53 3
R
e c
a l
l  
t
h
a
t  
i
n  
a  
p
a
r
t
i
c
u
l
a
r  
f
o
r
m
a
l  
t
h
e
o
r
y  
t
h
e  
f
e
a
t
u
r
e
s  
o
f  
a  
c
i
r
c
u
m
s
t
a
n
c
e  
m
u
s
t
include all elements with respect to which there are content operators, and the
aspects of a context must include all elements with respect to which there are
indexicals. Thus, a language with both the usual modal operators '0 ' ,  97, and
an indexical modal operator ' I t  is actually the case that'  wil l  contain a possible
world history feature in its circumstances as well as an analogous aspect in its
contexts. I f  a circumstance is an aspect of a context, as seems necessary for the
definition of truth, then we only need worry about aspects of contexts that are
not features of circumstances. The  most prominent of these is the agent o f  the
context, required to interpret the indexical I n  order to supply a corresponding
nonvacuous feature to circumstances we must treat contents in such a way that we
can ask whether they are true for various agents. (Not characters mind you, but
contents.) This can be done by representing the agent by a nesstral—a term which
plays the syntactical role of 'I '  but gets an interpretation only with respect to a
circumstance. Let a be a special variable that is not subject to quantification and
let b be a variable not in the language. Our variable a is the neutral. We wish to
introduce content operators which affect the agent place and which can be iterated.
Let R be a relation between individuals, for example 'aRb' for 'b is an uncle of a'.
Then we may interpret the operator ORO as (3b)(aR6 A ( I s )  (b =  a A O)J I f  i s
'a walks', ORO comes to 'an uncle of a walks'. The indexical 'I' can be represented
by an operator 0
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equivalent to replacing the neutral a by the indexical T.
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We could then represent contexts by the same indexed sets we use to
represent circumstances, and instead o f  having a logic o f  contexts and
circumstances we have simply a two-dimensional logic o f  indexed sets.
This is algebraically very neat and i t  permits a very simple and elegant
description of certain important classes of characters (for example, those
which are true a t  every pair  ( i ,  i), though the special significance o f
the set is somehow diminished in  the abstract formulation) ,as B u t  i t
also permits a simple and elegant introduction of many operators which
are monsters. I n  abstracting from the distinct conceptual roles played
by contexts o f  use and circumstances of  evaluation the special logic o f
indexicals has been obscured. O f  course restrictions can be put on the
two-dimensional logic to exorcise the monsters, but  to do so would be
to give up the mathematical advantages of that formulat ion.
37
I X .  A r g u m e n t  for  P r inc ip le  2: T r u e  Demonstrat ives
I return now to the argument that all indexicals are directly referential.
Suppose I point at Paul and say,
He now lives in Princeton, New Jersey.
Call what I  said—i.e., the content o f  my utterance, the  proposition
expressed—'Pat'. Is Pat true or false? True! Suppose that unbeknownst
to me, Paul had moved to  Santa Monica last week. Wo u l d  Pat have
then been true or  false? False! N o w,  the tr icky case: Suppose that
Paul and Charles had each disguised themselves as the other and had
switched places. I f  that had happened, and I  had uttered as I did, then
the proposition I  would have expressed would have been false. B u t  in
that possible context the proposition I  would have expressed is not Pat.
That is easy to see because the proposition I would have expressed, had
I pointed to Charles instead o f  Paul—call this proposition 'Mike'—not
only would have been false but  actually is false. P a t ,  I  would claim,
would stil l  be true in the circumstances o f  the envisaged possible con-
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Philosophical Logic 2 (1973): 77-96. Segerberg does metamathematical work in
his article and makes no special philosophical claims about its significance. That
has been clone by others.
"There  is one other difficulty in identifying the class of contexts with the class of
circumstances. The  special relationship between the indexicals T,  'here', 'now'
seems to  require that the agent of a context be at the location of the context
during the time of the context. But  this restriction is not plausible for arbitrary
circumstances. I t  appears that this approach will have difficulty in avoiding the
problems of (6) and (8) (section VII).
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text provided that Paul—in whatever costume he appeared—were sti l l
residing in Princeton.
I X .  ( i )  T h e  A rgumen ts
I am arguing that in order to determine what the truth-value of a propo-
sition expressed by a sentence containing a demonstrative would be under
other possible circumstances, the relevant individual is not the individual
that would have been demonstrated had those circumstances obtained
and the demonstration been set in a context of those circumstances, but
rather the individual demonstrated in  the context which d id generate
the proposition being evaluated. A s  I  have already noted, i t  is char-
acteristic o f  sentences containing demonstratives—or, for  that matter,
any indexical—that they may express different propositions in different
contexts. We must be wary of confusing the proposition that would have
been expressed by a  similar utterance in  a slightly different context—
say, one in which the demonstratum is changed—with the proposition
that was actually expressed. I f  we keep this distinction in mind—i.e., we
distinguish Pat and Mike—we are less likely to confuse what the truth-
value of the proposition actually expressed would have been under some
possible circumstances with what the truth-value of the proposition that
would have been expressed would have been under those circumstances.
When we consider the vast array of possible circumstances wi th re-
spect to which we might inquire into the truth of a proposition expressed
in some context c by an utterance u, i t  quickly becomes apparent that
only a small fraction of these circumstances wi l l  involve an utterance of
the same sentence in a similar context, and that there roust be a way of
evaluating the truth-value o f  propositions expressed using demonstra-
tives in  counterfactual circumstances i n  which no demonstrations are
taking place and no individual has the exact characteristics exploited in
the demonstration. Surely, i t  is irrelevant to determining whether what I
said would be true or not in some counterfactual circumstance, whether
Paul, or anyone for that matter, looked as he does now. A l l  that would
be relevant is where he lives. Therefore,
(T3) the relevant features o f  the demonstratum qua demonstra-
turn (compare, the relevant features o f  the x  Px qua the x
Fa)—namely, that the speaker is pointing at i t ,  that  i t  has
a certain appearance, is presented in a certain way—cannot
be the essential characteristics used to  identify the relevant
individual in counterfactual situations.
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These two arguments: the distinction between Pat and Mike, and con-
sideration of counterfactual situations in which no demonstration occurs,
are offered to support the view that demonstratives are devices of  direct
reference (r ig id designators, i f  you wi l l )  and, by contrast, t o  reject a
Fregean theory of  demonstratives.
I X ,  ( i i )  T h e  Fregean T h e o r y  o f  Demonst ra t ions
In order to develop the latter theory, in contrast to my own, we turn first
to a portion of the Fregean theory which I  accept: t he  Fregean theory
of demonstrations.
As you know, for a  Fregean the paradigm of  a meaningful expres-
sion is the definite description, which picks out or denotes an individual,
a unique individual, satisfying a condition s. T h e  individual is called
the denotation o f  the definite description and the condition s we may
identify with the sense of the definite description. Since a given individ-
ual may uniquely satisfy several distinct conditions, definite descriptions
with distinct senses may have the same denotation. And  since some con-
ditions may be uniquely satisfied by no individual, a definite description
may have a sense but no denotation. The condition by means of  which
a definite description picks out i ts denotation is the manner o f  presen-
tation o f  the denotation by the definite description.
The Fregean theory o f  demonstratives claims, correctly I  believe,
that the analogy between descriptions (short for 'definite descriptions')
and demonstrations is close enough to  provide a sense and denotation
analysis o f  the 'meaning' o f  a demonstration. T h e  denotation is the
demonstratum ( that  which is  demonstrated), and i t  seems quite nat-
ural to  regard each demonstration as presenting its demonstratum in
a particular manner, which we may regard as the sense o f  the demon-
stration. T h e  same individual could be demonstrated by  demonstra-
tions so different in manner of presentation that i t  would be informative
to a competent auditor-observer to  be told that the demonstrata were
one. F o r  example, i t  might be informative to you for me to tel l  you
that
That [pointing to Venus in the morning sky] is identical with
that [pointing to Venus in the evening sky].
(I would, o f  course, have to  speak very slowly.) T h e  two demonstra-
tions—call the first one 'Phos' and the second one 'Hes'—which accom-
panied the two occurrences o f  the demonstrative expression ' that '  have
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the same demonstratum but distinct manners of presentation. I t  is this
difference between the sense of Hes and the sense of Phos that accounts,
the Fregean claims, for the informativeness of the assertion.
It is possible, to pursue the analogy, for a demonstration to have no
demonstratum. T h i s  can arise in  several ways: through hallucination,
through carelessness (not noticing, in the darkened room, that  the sub-
ject had jumped off the demonstration platform a few moments before
the lecture began), through a  sortal conflict (using the demonstrative
phrase t h a t  ,  where F  is a common noun phrase, while demonstrat-
ing something which is not an F) ,  and in other ways.
Even Donnellans's important distinction between referential and at-
tributive uses of definite descriptions seems to fit, equally comfortably,the case of demonstrations.'
The Fregean hypostatizes demonstrations in  such a  way that  i t  is
appropriate to ask o f  a given demonstration, say Phos, what  would i t
have demonstrated under various counterfactual circumstances. P h o s
and lies might have demonstrated distinct individuals."
We should not allow our enthusiasm for analogy to overwhelm judg-
ment in this case. There are some relevant respects i n  which descrip-
tions and demonstrations are disanalogous. F i rs t ,  as David Lewis has
pointed out, demonstrations do not have a syntax, a fixed formal struc-
ture in terms of whose elements we might try to define, either directly
Or recursively, the notion of sense." Second, to different audiences (for
example, the speaker, those sitting in front of  the demonstration plat-
form, and those sitt ing behind the demonstration platform) the same
demonstration may have different senses. O r  perhaps we should say
that a single performance may involve distinct demonstrations from the
perspective of distinct audiences. ("Exact ly like proper names!" says the
Fregean, "as long as the demonstratum remains the same, these fluctu-
ations in sense are tolerable. B u t  they should be avoided in the system
3 8 1 have written elsewhere, in appendices YU and \Pill of "Bob and Carol and Ted
and Alice," of these matters and won't pursue the topic now.
i t  could then be proposed that demonstrations be individuated by the principle:
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standard audience can't determine, from the demonstration alone, whether the
contexts are distinct or identical. This makes the individuation of demonstrationsmore epistemological than the metaphysical proposal above.
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of a demonstrative science and should not appear in a perfect vehicle of
communication.")
I X .  ( i i i )  T h e  Fregean T h e o r y  o f  Demonstrat ives
Let us accept, tentatively and cautiously, the Fregean theory of demon-
strations, and turn now to the Fregean theory of demonstratives.
41 According to the Fregean theory of demonstratives, an occurrence of
a demonstrative expression functions rather like a place-holder for the
associated demonstration. T h e  sense o f  a sentence containing demon-
stratives is to be the result o f  replacing each demonstrative by a  con-
stant whose sense is given as the sense of the associated demonstration.
An important aim of the Fregean theory is, of course, to  solve Frege's
problem. A n d  i t  does that  quite neatly. Yo u  recall that the Fregean
accounted for the informativeness of
That [lies] =  that [Phos]
in terms of  the distinct senses Of Hes and Phos, N o w  we see that  the
senses o f  the two occurrences o f  ' that '  are identified w i th  these two
distinct senses so that the ultimate solution is exactly like that given by
Frege originally. The sense of the left ' that '  differs from the sense of the
right ' that'.
I X .  ( i v )  A r g u m e n t  Aga ins t  t h e  Fregean Theo ry  o f
Demonst ra t ives
Let us return now to our original example:
He [Delta] now lives in Princeton, New Jersey
where 'Delta' is the name of the relevant demonstration. I  assume that
in the possible circumstances described earlier, Paul and Charles hav-
ing disguised themselves as each other, Delta would have demonstrated
Charles. Therefore, according to the Fregean theory, the proposition
lust expressed, Pat, would have been false under the counterfactual cir-
cumstances o f  the switch. B u t  this, as argued earlier, is wrong. There-
fore, the Fregean theory of demonstratives though it  nicely solves Frege's
problem, is simply incorrect in associating propositions with utterances.
Let me recapitulate. We compared two theories as to the proposition
expressed by a sentence containing a demonstrative along with an asso-
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sial theory of indexicats. On the contrary, it has the fascination of the speculative.
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ciated demonstration. Bo th  theories allow that the demonstration can
be regarded as having both a sense and a demonstratum. M y  theory, the
direct reference theory, claims that in assessing the proposition in coun-
terfactual circumstances i t  is the actual demonstratum—in the example,
Paul—that is the relevant individual. The  Fregean theory claims that
the proposition is to be construed as i f  the sense o f  the demonstration
were the sense of  the demonstrative. Thus, in counterfactual situations
it is the individual that would have been demonstrated that  is the rele-
vant individual. According to the direct reference theory, demonstratives
are rigid designators. According to the Fregean theory, their denotation
varies in different counterfactual circumstances as the demonstrata of
the associated demonstration would vary in those circumstances.
The earlier distinction between Pat  and Mike, and the  discussion
of counterfactual circumstances in  which, as we would now put i t ,  the
demonstration would have demonstrated nothing, argue that  wi th  re-
spect t o  the problem o f  associating propositions wi th  utterances the
direct reference theory is correct and the Pregean theory is wrong.
1 have carefully avoided arguing for the direct reference theory by
using modal or subjunctive sentences for fear the Fregean would claim
that the peculiarity of demonstratives is not that they are rigid designa-
tors but that they always take primary scope. I f  I had argued only on
the basis of our intuitions as to the truth-value of
I f  Charles and Paul had changed chairs, then he (Delta)
would not now be living in Princeton
such a scope interpretation could be claimed. But  I  didn't.
The perceptive Fregeans among you wil l  have noted that I have said
nothing about how Frege's problem fares under a direct reference theory
of demonstratives. A n d  indeed, i f  ' that' accompanied by a demonstra-
tion is a rigid designator for the demonstratum, then
that (Hes) =  that (Phos)
looks like two rigid designators designating the same thing. U h  Ohl
will return to this in my Epistemological Remarks (section XVII).
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X .  F i x i n g  the  Reference vs. Supp ly ing  a S y n o n y m
4 2The Fregean is to be forgiven. H e  has made a  most natural mistake.
Perhaps he thought as follows: I f  I point at someone and say 'he', that
occurrence of 'he' must refer to the male at whom I am now pointing. I t
does! So far, so good, Therefore, the Fregean reasons, since 'he' (in its
demonstrative sense) means the same as 'the male at whom I  am now
pointing' and since the denotation of the latter varies with circumstances
the denotation o f  the former must also. B u t  th is  is wrong. S i m p l y
because i t  is a rule of the language that 'he' refers to the male at whom
I am now pointing (or, whom I  am now demonstrating, t o  be more
general), i t  does not follow that  any synonymy is thereby established.
In fact, th is is one o f  those cases i n  which—to use Kripke's excellent
idiom—the rule simply tells us how to  f ix the reference but  does not
supply a synonym.
Consider the proposition I  express with the utterance
He [Delta] is the male at whom I am now pointing.
Call that proposition 'Sean'. Now Sean is certainly true. We know from
the rules of  the language that any utterance of  that form must express
a true proposition. In  fact we would be justified in calling the sentence
He is the male at whom I am now pointing.
almost analytic. ( 'A lmost '  because o f  the hypothesis that  the demon-
strative is proper—that I am pointing at a unique male—is needed.)
But is Sean necessary? Certainly not, I  might have pointed at some-
one else.
This kind of mistake—to confuse a semantical rule which tells how to
fix the reference to a directly referential term with a rule which supplies
a synonym—is easy to  make. Since semantics must supply a meaning,
in the sense o f  content (as I  call i t ) ,  for expressions, one thinks natu-
rally that whatever way the referent o f  an expression is given by the
semantical rules, that way must stand for the content of the expression.
(Church [Or was i t  Carnap?] says as much, explicitly.) This hypothesis
42
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in Naming and Necessity for descriptive meaning that may be associated with a
proper name. A s  in several other cases of such parallels between proper names
and indexicals, the distinction, and its associated argument, seems more obvious
when applied to indexicals,
seems especially plausible, when, as is typical of indexicals,
the semantical rule which fixes the reference seems to exhaust
our knowledge of the meaning of the expression.
X .  ( i )  Reichenbach on Token  Reflexives
I t  was from such a perspective, I  believe, that Reichenbach bui l t  his inge-
nious theory of  indexicals. Reichenbach called such expressions 'token-
reflexive words' in accordance with his theory. He writes as follows:
We saw that most individual-descriptions are constructed by
reference to other individuals. Among these there is a class
of descriptions in which the individual referred to  is the act
of speaking. W e  have special words to indicate this refer-
ence; such words are ' I ' ,  'you', 'here', 'now', ' this'.  O f  the
same sort are the tenses of  verbs, since they determine time
by reference t o  the t ime when the words are uttered. T o
understand the function of these words we have to make use
of the distinction between token and symbol, 'token' mean-
ing the individual sign, and 'symbol' meaning the class o f
similar tokens (cf. P ) .  Wo rds  and sentences are symbols.
The words under consideration are words which refer to the
corresponding token used in  an individual act o f  speech, or
writing; they may therefore be called token-reflexive words.
I t  is easily seen that all these words can be defined in terms
of the phrase ' this token'. The word ' I ' ,  for instance, means
the same as 'the person who utters this token'; 'now' means
the same as 'the time at which this token was uttered', 'this
table' means the same as 'the table pointed to by a gesture
accompanying this token'. W e  therefore need inquire only
into the meaning of the phrase 'this token ' .
43
But is i t  true, for example, that
(10) ' I '  means the same as 'the person who utters this token'
It is certainly true that
I am the person who utters this token.
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But i f  (10) correctly asserted a  synonymy, then i t  would be true that
(11) I f  no one were to  utter this token, I  would not exist.
Beliefs such as (11) could make one a compulsive talker.
X I .  T h e  Mean ing  o f  Indexicals
In order to correctly and more explicitly state the semantical rule which
the dictionary attempts to capture by the entry
I: t h e  person who is speaking or writing
we would have to develop our semantical theory—the semantics of direct
reference—and then state that
(D1) ' I '  is an indexical, different utterances o f  which may have
different contents
(D3) ' I '  is, in each of  its utterances, directly referential
(D2) In each of its utterances, ' I '  refers to the person who utters it.
We have seen errors in the Fregean analysis of demonstratives and in
Reichenbach's analysis of indexicals, all of which stemmed from failure
to realize that t h e s e
-
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d i r e c t l y  
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word is directly referential are we saying that its meaning is its reference
(its only meaning is its reference, i ts  meaning is nothing more than its
referenc )? Certainly no t .
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language and is what is known by competent speakers, I  would be more
inclined to say in the case of directly referential words and phrases that
their reference is no part o f  their meaning. T h e  meaning of the word
'I '  does not change when different persons use i t .  The meaning of ' I '  is
given by the rules (D1), (D2), and (D3) above.
" W e  see here a drawback to the terminology 'direct reference'. I t  suggests falsely
that the reference is not mediated by a meaning, which it is. The meaning (charac-
ter) is directly associated, by convention, with the word. The meaning determines
the referent; and the referent determines the content. I t  is this to which I alluded
in the parenthetical remark following the picture on page 486. Note, however, that
the kind of descriptive meaning involved in giving the character of indexicals like
'I', 'now', etc., is, because of the focus on context rather than circumstance, unlike
that traditionally thought of  as Fregean sense. I t  is the idea that the referent
determines the content—that, contra Prege, there is a road back—that I wish to
capture. This is the importance of Principle 2.
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Meanings tell us how the content of a word or phrase is determined
by the context of use. Thus the meaning of a word or phrase is what I
have called its character. (Words and phrases with no indexical element
express the same content in every context; they have a fixed character.)
To supply a synonym for a word or phrase is to find another with the
same character; finding another wi th the same content in  a  particular
context certainly won't do. The content of ' I '  used by me may be iden-
tical with the content o f  'you' used by you. This  doesn't make ' I '  and
'you' synonyms. Frege noticed that i f  one wishes to say again what one
said yesterday using 'today', today one must use 'yesterday'. (Inciden-
tally the relevant passage, quoted on page 501, propounds what I  take
to be a direct reference theory of the indexicals 'today' and 'yesterday'.)
But 'today' and 'yesterday' are not synonyms. For two words or phrases
to be synonyms, they must have the same content i n  every context.
In general, for indexicals, i t  is not possible to find synonyms. T h i s  is
because indexicals are directly referential, and the compound phrases
which can be used to give their reference ('the person who is speaking',
'the individual being demonstrated', etc.) are not.
X I I .  D t h a t
4 5
I t  would be useful to have a way of converting an arbitrary singular term
into one which is directly referential.
Recall that we earlier regarded demonstrations, which are required to
'complete' demonstratives, as a kind of  description. The demonstrative
was then treated as a directly referential term whose referent was the
demonstratum of the associated demonstration.
Now why not regard descriptions as a  kind o f  demonstration, and
introduce a  special demonstrative which requires completion by a de-
scription and which is treated as a directly referential term whose refer-
ent is the denotation of the associated description? Why  not? Why not
indeed! I  have done so, and I  write i t  thus:
dth at [a]
where a is any description, or, more generally, any singular term. 'Dthat '
is simply the demonstrative ' that '  with the following singular term func-
4 5 Pronunciation note on 'cl.that'. The word is not pronounced dee-that or duh-that.
I t  has only one syllable. Although articulated differently from 'that'  (the tongue
begins behind the teeth), the sounds are virtually indistinguishable to all but
native speakers.
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tioning as i ts  demonstration. (Un less  you hold a  Fregean theory o f
demonstratives, in which case its meaning is as stipulated above.)
Now we can come much closer to providing genuine synonyms.
' I '  means the same as 'd that  [ the person who utters th is
token]'.
(The fact that this alleged synonymy is cast in the theory of utterances
rather than occurrences introduces some subtle complications, which
have been discussed by Reichenbach.)
X I I I .  Contex ts ,  Tr u t h ,  and Logical  T r u t h
I wish, i n  this section, to  contrast an occurrence o f  a well-formed ex-
pression (my technical term for the combination of an expression and a
context) wi th an utterance of an expression.
There are several arguments for my  notion, bu t  the main one is
from Remark 1 on the Logic o f  Demonstratives (section X I X  below):
I have sometimes said that  the content o f  a sentence in  a  context is,
roughly, the proposition the sentence would express i f  uttered i n  that
context. Th i s  description is not quite accurate on two counts. First ,  i t
is important to  distinguish an utterance from a sentence-in-a-context.
The former notion is from the theory o f  speech acts, the lat ter from
semantics, Utterances take time, and utterances o f  distinct sentences
cannot be simultaneous (i.e., i n  the same context). B u t  i n  order t o
develop a  logic of demonstratives we must be able to evaluate several
premises and a  conclusion a l l  in  the same context. W e  do not  want
arguments involving indexicals to become valid simply because there is
no possible context in  which al l  the premises are uttered, and thus no
possible context in which all are uttered truthfully.
Since the content of an occurrence of a sentence containing indexicals
depends on the context, the notion o f  truth must be relativized to  a
context.
I f  c is a context, then an occurrence o f  0 in c is true i f  the
content expressed by 0 in this context is true when evaluated
with respect to  the circumstance of  the context.
We see from the notion of truth that among other aspects o f  a context
must be a possible circumstance. Every context occurs in a  particular
circumstance, and there are demonstratives such as 'actual' which refer
to that circumstance.
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I f  you t r y  out the notion o f  truth on a few examples, you wi l l  see
that i t  is correct. I f  I now utter a sentence, I  wil l  have uttered a  truth
just in case what I  said, the content, is true in these circumstances.
As is now common for intensional logics, we provide for the notion of
a structure, comprising a family of circumstances. Each such structure
will determine a set of  possible contexts. Tru th  in a structure, is t ru th
in every possible context of the structure. Logical truth is truth in everystructure.
X I V.  S u m m a r y  o f  Findings (so far) :  P u r e  Indexica ls
Let me t ry  now to  summarize my findings regarding the semantics o f
demonstratives and other indexical& F i r s t ,  le t  us consider the  non-
demonstrative indexicals such as ' I ' ,  'here' ( i n  i t s  nondemonstrative
sense), 'now', 'today', 'yesterday', etc. I n  the case of  these words, the
linguistic conventions which constitute meaning consist of rules specify-
ing the referent of  a given occurrence of the word (we might say, a given
token, or even utterance, o f  the word, i f  we are will ing to be somewhat
less abstract) i n  terms o f  various features o f  the context o f  the occur-
rence. Although these rules fix the referent and, in a very special sense,
might be said to  define the indexical, the way in which the rules are
given does not provide a synonym for the indexical. T h e  rules tel l  us
for any possible occurrence o f  the indexical what the referent would be,
but they do not constitute the content of such an occurrence. Indexicals
are directly referential. T h e  rules tel l  us what i t  is that is referred to.
Thus, they determine the content (the propositional constituent) for a
particular occurrence o f  an indexical. B u t  they are not  a  part o f  the
content (they constitute no part o f  the propositional constituent). I n
order to  keep clear on a topic where ambiguities constantly threaten, I
have introduced two technical terms: content and character for the two
kinds of  meaning (in addition to extension) I  associate with indexical&
Distinct occurrences o f  an indexical (in distinct contexts) may not only
have distinct referents, they may have distinct meanings in the sense o f
content. I f  I say " I  am tired today" today and Montgomery Furth says
"I am tired today" tomorrow, our utterances have different contents in
that the factors which are relevant t o  determining the truth-value o f
what Furth said in  both actual and counterfactual circumstances are
quite different from the factors which are relevant to  determining the
truth-value of what I  said. O u r  two utterances are as different in con-
tent as are the sentences "David Kaplan is tired on 26 March 1977" and
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"Montgomery Furth is t ired on 27 March 1977." Bu t  there is another
sense of meaning in which, absent lexical or syntactical ambiguities, two
occurrences o f  the same word or phrase musi mean the same. (Other-
wise how could we learn and communicate with language?) Th is  sense
of meaning—which I  call character—is what determines the content o f
an occurrence o f  a word or phrase in  a  given context. F o r  indexicals,
the rules o f  language constitute the meaning in the sense of  character.
As normally expressed, in  dictionaries and the like, these rules are in-
complete in  that, by  omitt ing to mention that  ,indexicals are directly
referential, they fail  to specify the ful l  content o f  an occurrence o f  an
indexical.
Three important features to keep in mind about these two kinds of
meaning are:
1. C h a r a c t e r  applies only to words and phrases as types, con-
tent to occurrences o f  words and phrases in contexts.
2. O c c u r r e n c e s  o f  two phrases can agree i n  content although
the phrases differ in character, and two phrases can agree in
_character but differ in content in distinct contexts.
3. T h e  relationship o f  character t o  content is something l ike
that tradit ionally regarded as the relationship o f  sense t o
denotation, character is a way of presenting content.
X V.  F u r t h e r  Detai ls:  Demonst ra t i ves  and
Demonstrat ions
Let me turn now to the demonstratives proper, those expressions which
must be associated with a demonstration in order to determine a refer-
ent, I n  addition to the pure demonstratives ' that '  and 'this' there are
a variety of demonstratives which contain built-in sortals: 'he' for ' that
male', 'she' for 'that female'," etc., and there are demonstrative phrases
built from a pure demonstrative and a common noun phrase: ' tha t  man
drinking a  martini ' ,  etc. W o r d s  and phrases which have demonstra-
tive use may have other uses as well, for example, as bound variable or
pronouns of laziness (anaphoric use).
I  accept, tentatively and cautiously, the Fregean theory o f  demon-
strations according to which:
" 'Male '  and 'female' are here used in  the grammatical sense of gender, not the
biological sense,
(1) A  demonstration is a way of presenting an individual.
(2) A  given demonstration in certain counterfactual circumstan-
ces,would have demonstrated (i.e., presented) an individual
other than the individual actually demonstrated.
A demonstration which fails to demonstrate any individual
might have demonstrated one, and a  demonstration which
demonstrates an individual might have demonstrated no in-
dividual at all.
(
3
)
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So far we have asserted that i t  is not an essential property of  a given
demonstration (according to the Fregean theory) that  i t  demonstrate .
agiven individual, or indeed, tha t  i t  demonstrate any individual at all.
I t  is this feature o f  demonstrations: t ha t  demonstrations which in fact
demonstrate the same individual might have demonstrated distinct indi-
viduals, which provides a solution to the demonstrative version of Frege's
problem (why is an utterance of 'that [Hes] t h a t  [Phos]' informative?)
analogous to Frege's own solution to  the definite description version.
There is some theoretical latt i tude as to  how we should regard such
other features o f  a demonstration as i ts place, time, and agent. J u s t
to f ix ideas, let  us regard al l  these features as accidental. ( I t  may be
helpful to think of demonstrations as types and particular performances
of them as their tokens). Then,
(4) A  given demonstration might have been mounted by someone
other than its actual agent, and might be repeated i n  the
same or a different place.
Although we are not now regarding the actual place and t ime of a
demonstration as essential to i t ,  i t  does seem to me to be essential to
a demonstration that i t  present its demonstrata from some perspective,
that is, as the individual that looks thusly from here now. On  the other
hand, i t  does not seem to me to be essential to a demonstration that i t
be mounted by any agent at 8,11.
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Mike the emphasis on the counterfactual situation in which the same agent was
doing the pointing was misguided and that feature of counterfactual situations is
irrelevant. I t  is the agent of course who focuses your attention on the relevant
local individual. But that needn't be done by anyone; we might have a convention
that whoever is appearing on the demonstration platform is the demonstratum,
or the speaker might take advantage of a natural demonstration of opportunity:an explosion or a shooting star.
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We now have a kind of  standard form for demonstrations:
The individual that has appearance A from here now
where an appearance is something like a picture with a little arrow point-
ing t o  the relevant subject. T r y i n g  to put  i t  into words, a  particular
demonstration might come out like:
The brightest heavenly body now visible from here.
In this example we see the importance o f  perspective. T h e  same
demonstration, differently located, may present a- different demonstra-
tum (a twin, for example).
I f  we set a demonstration, 6, in a context, c, we determine the relevant
perspective (i.e., the values o f  'here' and 'now'). We also determine the
demonstratum, i f  there is one—if, that is, in  the circumstances o f  the
context there is an individual that  appears that  way from the place
and t ime of  the context .
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just the demonstratum in the possible world of  the context. B y  fixing
the perspective, we determine for each possible circumstance what, i f
anything, would appear like that from that perspective. Th is  is to say,
we determine a content. Th is  content wi l l  not, in general, be fixed (like
that determined by  a  rigid designator). A l t h o u g h  i t  was Venus that
appeared a  certain way from a  certain location i n  ancient Greece, i t
might have been Mars. Under certain counterfactual conditions, i t  would
have been Mars that appeared just that way from just that location. Set
in a  different context, 5
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content at all. When I look at myself in the mirror each morning I know
that I  didn't  look like that ten years ago—and I  suspect that  nobodydid.
The preceding excursion in to  a  more detailed Fregean theory o f
demonstrations was simply in order to establish the following structural
features of demonstrations:
1. A  demonstration, when set in  a context (i.e., an occurrence
of a demonstration), determines a content.
"Since, as remarked earlier, the speaker and different members of  the audience
generally have different perspectives on the demonstration, it may appear slightly
different to each of them. Thus each may take a slightly different, demonstration
to have been performed. Insofar as the agent and audience of a given context can
differ in location, the location of a context is the location of the agent. Therefore
the demonstratum of a given demonstration set in  a given context wil l  be the
individual, if any, thereby demonstrated from the speaker's point of view.
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2. I t  is not required that an occurrence of a demonstration have
a fixed content.
In view o f  these features, we can associate wi th  each demonstra-
tion a  character which represents the 'meaning' or manner o f  presen-
tation o f  the demonstration. W e  have now brought the semantics o f
demonstrations and descriptions in to  isomorphism.
49 T h u s ,  I  r e g a r dmy 'dthat' operator as representing the general case of  a demonstrative.
Demonstratives are incomplete expressions which must be completed by
a demonstration (type). A  complete sentence (type) wi l l  include an as-
sociated demonstration (type) for each of its demonstratives. Thus each
demonstrative, d, wil l  be accompanied by a demonstration, 8, thus:
d[6]
The character o f  a complete demonstrative is given by the semanticalrule:
In any context c, d[6] is a directly referential term that desig-
nates the demonstratum, i f  any, of 6 in c, and that otherwise
designates nothing.
Obvious adjustments are to  be made to take into account any common
noun phrase which accompanies or is built-in to the demonstrative.
Since no immediately relevant structural differences have appeared
between demonstrations and descriptions, I  regard the treatment of the
'dthat' operator in  the formal logic LD as accounting for the general
case I t  would be a simple matter to  add to the syntax a category o f
'nonlogical demonstration constants'. (Note  that  the indexicals of
are al l  logical signs in the sense that  their meaning (character] is not
given by the structure but by the evaluation rules.)
X V I .  A l t e rna t i ve  Treatments o f  Demonstrat ions
The foregoing development o f  the Fregean theory o f  demonstrations is
not inevitable. Michael Bennett has proposed that only places be demon-
strata and that we require an explicit or implicit common noun phrase
to accompany the demonstrative, so that:
" W e  should not, of course, forget the many disanalogies noted earlier nor fail to note 1
that though a description is associated with a particular character by linguistic !
convention, a demonstration is associated with its character by nature. 5
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that [pointing at a person]
becomes
dthat [the person who is there [pointing at a place].
My findings do not include the claim that the—or better, a—Fregean
theory of demonstrations is correct. I  can provide an alternative account
for those who regard demonstrations as nonrepeatable nonseparable fea-
tures of contexts. The conception now under consideration is that in cer-
tain contexts the agent is demonstrating something, or more than one
thing, and in others not. Thus just as we can speak of agent, time, place,
and possible world history as features of a context, we may also speak of
first demonstratum, second demonstratum, ( s o m e  of which may be
null) as features of a context. We then attach subscripts to our demon-
stratives and regard the n-th demonstrative, when set in a context, as
rigid designator of the n-th demonstratum of the context, Such a rule
associates a character with each demonstrative. I n  providing no role
for demonstrations as separable 'manners of presentation' this theory
eliminates the interesting distinction between demonstratives and other
indexicals. We might call it the Indexical theory of demonstratives. (Of
course every reasonable theory of demonstratives treats them as indexi-
cals of some kind. I  regard my own theory of indexicals in general, and
the nondemonstrative indexicals in particular, as essentially uncontro-
versial, Therefore I  reserve Indexical theory of demonstratives for the
controversial alternative to the Fregean theory of demonstrations—the
Fregean theory of demonstratives having been refuted.)
Let us call my theory as based on the Fregean theory of demon-
strations the Corrected Fregean theory o f  demonstratives. The  Fregean
theory of demonstrations may be extravagant, but compared with its
riches, the indexical theory is a mean thing. From a logical point of
view, the riches of the Corrected Fregean theory of demonstratives are
already available in connection with the demonstrative 'dthat' and its
descriptive pseudodemonstrations, so a decision to enlarge the language
of LD with additional demonstratives whose semantics are in accord with
the Indexical theory need not be too greatly lamented.
If we consider Frege's problem, we have the two formulations:
that [Hes] =  that [Phos]
and
thati =  that2
Both provide their sentence with an informative character. B u t  the
Pregean idea that that very demonstration might have picked out a dif-
ferent demonstratum seems to me to capture more of the epistemological
situation than the Indexicalist's idea that in some contexts the first and
second demonstrata differ.
The Corrected Fregean theory, by incorporating demonstration types
in its sentence types, accounts for more differences in informativeness
as differences in meaning (character). I t  thereby provides a nice Frege-
type solution to many Frege-type problems. But it can only forestall the
resort to directly epistemological issues, it cannot hold them in abeyance
indefinitely. Therefore I turn to epistemological remarks.
X V I I .  Epistemological  R e m a r k s
5
c !How do content and character serve as objects of thought? Let us state,once again, Frege's problem
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In (FP) a, a r e  arbitrary singular terms. (In future formulations, I will
omit the parentheticals as understood.) When a and /3 are demonstra-
tive free, Frege explained the difference in terms of his notion of sense,
A notion which, his writings generally suggest, should be identified with
our content. But it is clear that Frege's problem can be reinstituted in a
form in which resort to contents will not explain differences in 'cognitive
significance'. We need only ask,
(FPD) How can r
d t h a t [ a ]  
=  
d t h a t t
1 3 r  
i f  
t r u
e ,  
d i f
f e r  
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significance from r -
d t h a t [ a ]  
=  
d t h a t [
a r ?
Since, as we shall show, for any term -y,
Cy = dthatbf  is analytic
the sentence pair in (FP) will differ in cognitive significance if and only if
the sentence pair in (FPD) differ similarly. [There are a few assumptions
built in here, but they are O.K.] Note, however, that the content of
'dthatrar and the content of 'dthat[g are the same whenever r
a  =
" T h i s  section has benefited from the opportunity to read, and discuss with him,John Perry's paper "Frege on Demonstratives."
1.
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is true, Thus the difference in cognitive significance between the sentence
pair in (FPD) cannot be accounted for in terms of content,
I f  Frege's solution to  (FP) was correct, then ce and i
3  h a v e  d i f f e r -ent contents. F rom this i t  follows that 'dthat[cer and 'dthat [Or have
different characters, l i t  doesn't really, because o f  the identification o f
contents w i th  intensions, but let i t  pass.] I s  character, then, the object
of thought?
I f  you and I  both say to ourselves,
(B) " I  am getting bored"
have we thought the same thing? We could not have, because what you
thought was true while what I  thought was false.
What we must do is disentangle two epistemological notions: t h e
objects of  thought (what Frege called "Thoughts") and the cognitive sig-
nificance o f  an object o f  thought. As  has been noted above, a character
may be likened to a manner of presentation of a content. This suggests
that we identify objects of thought with contents and the cognitive sig-
nificance of such objects with characters.
E. P r i nc i p l e  1 Objects of  thought (Thoughts) =  Contents
E. P r i nc i p l e  2 Cognitive significance o f  a Thought =  Character
According to  this view, the thoughts associated wi th 'd that [a ]  =
dthatt0)
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the denotation, mind you, but the thought) is presented differently.
I t  is important to see that we have not simply generalized Frege's
theory, providing a higher order Fregean sense for each name of a reg-
ular Fregean sense." I n  Frege's theory, a given manner of presentation
presents the same object to all mankind."  B u t  for us, a  given manner
of presentation—a character—what we both said to ourselves when we
both said (B)—will,  in general, present different objects (of thought) to
different persons (and even different Thoughts to the same person a t
different times),
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Frege's theory,
52 See his remarks in "On Sense and NominaturreI regarding the "common treasure of
thoughts which is transmitted from generation to generation" and remarks there
and in T h e  Thought" in  connection with tensed sentences, that "Only a sen-
tence supplemented by a time-indication and complete in every respect expresses
a thought."
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How then can we claim that  we have captured the idea o f  cogni-
tive significance? To  break the l ink between cognitive significance and
universal Fregean senses and at the same t ime forge the l ink  between
cognitive significance and character we must come to see the context-
sensitivity (dare I call i t  ego-orientation?) of  cognitive states.
Let us t ry a Putnam-like experiment. We raise two identical twins,
Castor and Pollux, under qualitatively identical conditions, qualitatively
identical stimuli, etc. I f  necessary, we may monitor their brain states
and make small corrections in their brain structures i f  they begin drift-
ing apart. They  respond to  all cognitive stimuli in identical fashion.
53Have we not been successful i n  achieving the same cognitive (i.e., psy-
chological) state? O f  course we have, what  more could one ask! B u t
wait, they believe different things. Each sincerely says,
My brother was born before I  was
and the beliefs they thereby express conflict. I n  this, Castor speaks the
truth, while Pollux speaks falsely. This does not reflect on the identity
of their cognitive states, for, as Putnam has emphasized, circumstances
alone do not determine extension (here, the truth-value) from cognitive
state, Insofar  as distinct persons can be in  the same cognitive state,Castor and Pollux are.
E. Co ro l l a r y  1 I t  is an almost inevitable consequence o f  the fact that
two persons are in the same cognitive state, that they wi l l  disagree
in their  attitudes toward some object o f  thought.
The corollary applies equally well to the same person at  different times,
and to the same person at the same time in different circumstances." I n
general, the corollary applies to any individuals x , y in different contexts.
My a im was to  argue that the cognitive significance o f  a word or
phrase was to be identified wi th  i ts character, the way the content is
presented to  us. I n  discussing the twins, I  tried to  show that  persons
53 Perhaps i t  should be mentioned here, to forestall an objection, that neither uses
a proper name for the other or for himself—only 'my brother' and T—and that
raising them required a lot of environmental work to maintain the necessary sym-
metries, or, alternatively, a lot of work with the brain state machine. I f  proper
names are present, and each uses a different name for himself (or, for the other),
they will never achieve the same total cognitive state since one will sincerely say,
"I am Castor" and the other will not. They may still achieve the same cognitivestate in its relevant part.
54 The corollary would also apply to the same person at the same time in the same
circumstances but in different, places, if such could be.
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could be in the same total  cognitive state and stil l, as we would say,
believe different things. T h i s  doesn't prove that  the cognitive content
of, say, a  single sentence o r  even a  word is t o  be identified w i th  i ts
character, but  i t  strongly suggests it.
Let me t ry  a different line of argument. We agree that a given con-
tent may be presented under various characters and that consequently
we may hold a propositional attitude toward a given content under one
character but  not under another. ( F o r  example, on March 27 o f  this
year, having lost track of the date, I  may continue to hope to be finished
by this March 26, wi thout  hoping to  be finished by yesterday.) N o w
instead of arguing that character is what we would ordinarily call cog-
nitive significance, let me just ask why we should be interested in  the
character under which we hold our various attitudes. Why should we be
interested in that special kind of significance that is sensitive to the use
of indexicals; ' I ' ,  'here', 'now', ' that ' ,  and the like? John Perry, in  his
stimulating and insightful paper "Frege on Demonstratives" asks and
answers this question. [Perry uses 'thought' where I  would use 'object
of thought' or 'content', he uses 'apprehend' for 'believe' but note that
other psychological verbs would yield analogous cases. I  have taken a
few liberties in  substituting my own terminology for Perry's and have
added the emphasis.]
Why should we care under what character someone appre-
hends a thought, so long as he does? I  can only sketch the
barest suggestion o f  an answer here. W e  use the manner
of presentation, the character, t o  individuate psychological
states, in  explaining and predicting action. I t  is the manner
of presentation, the character and not  the thought appre-
hended, that  is tied to human action. When you and I  have
beliefs under the common character o f  'A bear is about to
attack me', we behave similarly. We  both roll up in  a ball
and t ry  to be as stil l  as possible. Different thoughts appre-
hended, same character, same behavior. W h e n  you and I
both apprehend that  I  am about to be attacked by a bear,
we behave differently. I  rol l  up in  a  ball, you run t o  get
help, Same thought apprehended, different characters, di f-
ferent behaviors.
55
Perry's examples can be easily multiplied. M y  hope to be finished
by a certain t ime is sensitive to how the content corresponding to  the
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time is presented, as 'yesterday' or as 'this March 26'. I f  I see, reflected
in a window, the image of a man whose pants appear to be on fire, my
behavior is sensitive to whether I  think, 'His pants are on fire' or  'My
pants are on fire', though the object of  thought may be the same.
So long as Frege confined his attention to indexical free expressions,
and given his theory of  proper names, i t  is not surprising that  he did
not distinguish objects of thought (content) from cognitive significance
(character), for that is the realm of fixed character and thus, as already
remarked, there is  a  natural identification o f  character w i t h  content.
Frege does, however, discuss indexicals in two places. The first passage,
in which he discusses 'yesterday' and 'today' I  have already discussed.
Everything he says there is  essentially correct, ( H e  does no t  go far
enough.) The second passage has provoked few endorsements and much
skepticism. I t  too, I  believe, is susceptible o f  an interpretation which
makes i t  essentially correct. I  quote i t  in full,
Now everyone is presented t o  himself in a  particular and
primitive way, in which he is presented to no one else. So,
when Dr. Lauben thinks that he has been wounded, he wil l
probably take as a basis this primitive way in  which he is
presented t o  himself. A n d  only D r.  Lauben  himself can
grasp thoughts determined i n  this way. B u t  now he may
want to communicate with others. I l e  cannot communicate
a thought which he alone can grasp. Therefore, i f  he now
says ' I  have been wounded', he must use the ' I '  in a  sense
that can be grasped by others, perhaps in the sense o f  'he
who is speaking to you at this moment', by doing which he
makes the associated conditions of his utterance serve for the
expression of his thought . '
What is the particular and primit ive way in  which Dr.  Lauben is
presented to  himself? W h a t  cognitive content presents Dr.  Lauben to
himself, bu t  presents h im to nobody else? Thoughts determined this
way can be grasped by Dr.  Lauben,  bu t  no one else can grasp that
thought determined in that way. The answer, I  believe, is, simply, that
Dr. Lauben is presented to  himself under the character of
A sloppy thinker might succumb t o  the temptation to  slide f rom
an acknowledgement of the privileged perspective we each have on our-
selves—only I  can refer t o  me as ' I '—to  the conclusions: f i rs t ,  t h a t
56 Got tlob Frage, "The Thought: A Logical Inquiry," p. 298,
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this perspective necessarily yields a  privileged picture o f  what is seen
(referred to), and second, that this picture is what is intended when one
makes use of the privileged perspective (by saying 'I'). These conclusions,
even i f  correct, are not forced upon us. The character of 'I '  provides the
acknowledged privileged perspective, whereas the analysis of the content
of particular occurrences o f  T  provides for (and needs) no  privileged
pictures. There may be metaphysical, epistemological, or ethical reasons
why I  (so conceived) a m  especially important t o  myself. (Compare:
why now is an especially important time to me. I t  too is presented in
a particular and primit ive way, and this moment cannot be presented
at any other t ime in the same w a y. )
5 7  B u t  t h e  
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Frege—that everyone is presented to himself in a particular and primitive
way—can be fully accounted for using only our semantical theory.
Furthermore, regarding the first conclusion, I  sincerely doubt that
there is, for  each of  us on each occasion o f  the use o f  'I ', a particular,
primitive, and incommunicable Fregean self-concept which we taci t ly
express to ourselves. A n d  regarding the second conclusion: even i f  Cas-
tor were sufficiently narcissistic to associate such self-concepts with his
every use of  'I', his twin, Pollux, whose mental life is qualitatively iden-
tical with Castor's, would associate the same self-concept with his every
(matching) use of T.
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result that when Castor and Pollux each say 'I ' ,  they do not thereby dis-
tinguish themselves from one another. ( A n  even more astonishing result
is possible. Suppose that  due to a bit of self-deception the self-concept
held in  common by Castor and Pollux fits neither of them. The second
conclusion then leads irresistibly to the possibility that when Castor and
Pollux each say ' I '  they each refer to a third party!)
• T h e  perceptive reader wi l l  have noticed that  the conclusions of the
sloppy thinker regarding the pure indexical ' I '  are not unlike those of the
Fregean regarding true demonstratives. The sloppy thinker has adopted
a demonstrative theory of indexicals: T  is synonymous with 'this person'
[along with an appropriate subjective demonstration], 'now' with ' this
time', 'here' with 'this place' [each associated with some demonstration],
etc. L i k e  the Fregean, the sloppy thinker errs i n  believing that  the
51
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it were. But  now we are directly acquainted with it. ( I  believe I owe this point to
John Perry.)" Unless, of course, the self-concept involved a bit of direct reference. In  which case
(when irect reference is admitted) there seems no need for the whole theory of
Fregean self-concepts. Unless, of  course, direct reference is limited to items of
direct acquaintance, of which more below.
sense of the demonstration is the sense of  the indexical, but  the sloppy
thinker commits an additional error in believing that such senses are in
any way necessarily associated wi th uses o f  pure indexicals. T h e  slide
from privileged perspective to privileged picture is the sloppy thinker's
original sin. On ly  one who is located in the exact center of  the Sahara
Desert is entitled to refer to  that place as 'here', but  aside from that,
the place may present no distinguishing features.
59 The sloppy thinker's conclusions may have another source. Fai lure
to distinguish between the cognitive significance o f  a thought and the
thought itself seems to have led some to believe that the elements of  an
object o f  thought must each be directly accessible to  the mind. F rom
this i t  follows that  i f  a singular proposition is an object o f  thought,
the thinker must somehow be immediately acquainted with each o f  the
individuals involved. Bu t ,  as we have seen, the situation is rather dif-
ferent f rom this. Singular propositions may be presented t o  us under
characters which neither imply nor presuppose any special form of:ac-
quaintance wi th the individuals of the singular propositions. T h e  psy-
chological states, perhaps even the epistemological situations, of  Castor
and Pollux are alike, yet they assert distinct singular propositions when
they each say 'My brother was born before me', Had they lived at dif-
ferent times they might still have been situated alike epistemologically
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from Mrege. How are we to account for the second part of Frege's remarks?
Suppose Dr. Lauben wants to communicate his thought without disturbing its
cognitive content. (Th ink  of trying to tel l  a color-blind person that the green
light should be replaced. You would have to find another way of communicating
what you wanted to get across.) H e  can't communicate that thought with that
significance, so, he himself would have to attach a nonstandard significance to 'P.
Here is a suggestion, He points at his auditor and uses the demonstrative 'you'.
If we neglect fine differences in perspective, the demonstration will have the same
character for all present and i t  certainly will have the same demonstratum for all
present, therefore the demonstrative will have the same character and content for
all present. The indexical 'now' will certainly have the same character and content.
for all present. Thus 'the person who is speaking to you [points) now' wil l have
a common character and content for all those present, Unfortunately the content
is not that of T  as Dr. Lauben standardly uses it, He needs a demonstrative like
'dthat' Co convert the description to a term with a fixed content. He chooses the
demonstrative 'he', with a relative clause construction to make clear his intention.
Now, i f  Dr. Lauben uses 'I' with the nonstandard meaning usually attached to 'he
who is speaking to you [points] now' he wi l l  have found a way to communicate
his original thought in a form whose cognitive significance is common to all. Veryclever, Dr. Lauben.
[Perhaps it is poor pedagogy to join this fanciful interpretation of the second
part of the passage with the serious interpretation of the first part.]
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while asserting distinct singular propositions in saying ' I t  is quiet here
now'. A  kidnapped heiress, locked in the trunk o f  a car, knowing nei-
ther the time nor where she is, may think ' I t  is quiet here now' and the
indexicals wil l  remain directly referential.
61)
E. Co ro l l a r y  2 Ignorance o f  the referent does not defeat the directly
referential character of indesicals.
From this i t  follows that  a  special form o f  knowledge o f  an object is
neither required nor presupposed in  order that a person may entertain
as object of thought a singular proposition involving that object.
There is nothing inaccessible to the mind about the semantics of di-
rect reference, even when the reference is to that which we know only by
description. W h a t  allows us to take various propositional attitudes to-
wards singular propositions is not the form of our acquaintance with the
objects but is rather our ability to manipulate the conceptual apparatus
of direct reference,e
1 The foregoing remarks are aimed a t  refuting Direct Acquaintance
Theories o f  direct reference. According to such theories, the question
whether an utterance expresses a singular proposition turns, in the first
instance, on the speaker's knowledge o f  the referent rather than on the
form o f  the reference. I f  the speaker lacks the appropriate form of  ac-
quaintance wi th the referent, the utterance cannot express a  singular
proposition, and any apparently directly referring expressions used must
be abbreviations or  disguises for something like Fregean descriptions.
Perhaps the Direct Acquaintance theorist thought that  only a  theory
like his could permit singular propositions while still providing a solu-
tion for Frege's problem. I f  we could directly refer to a given object in
nonequivalent ways (e.g., as 'dthat[Hes]' and 'cithat[Phosr), we could
not—so he thought—explain the difference in cognitive significance be-
tween the appropriate instances o f  ' a  =  a '  and r
c e  =  1 3
1
.  H e n c e ,  t h e
objects susceptible to direct reference must not permit such reference in
inequivalent ways, These objects must, in a certain sense, be wholly lo-
cal and completely given so that for any two directly coreferential terms
' C a n  the heiress plead that she could not have believed a singular proposition
involving the place p since when thinking 'here' the didn't know she was at p, that
she was, in fact, unacquainted with the place p? No Ignorance of the referent is
no excuse.
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uisite to having a singular proposition as object of thought. I  Avill t ry to find a
better way to express the point in a succeeding draft.
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a and =  w i l l  be uniformative to anyone appropriately situ-
ated, epistemologically, to  be able to  use these te rms .
62  I  h o p e  t h a tmy discussion o f  the two kinds of meaning—content and character—will
have shown the Direct Acquaintance Theorist tha t  his views are not
the inevitable consequence of  the admission of directly referential terms.
From the point of view of a lover of direct reference this is good, since
the Direct Acquaintance theorist admits direct reference in  a portion of
language so narrow that i t  is used only by philosophers,
63 I have said nothing to dispute the epistemology o f  the Direct Ac-
quaintance theorist, nothing to deny that there exists his special kind of
object with which one can have his special kind of acquaintance. I  have
only denied the relevance of these epistemological claims to the semantics
of direct reference. I f  we sweep aside metaphysical and epistemological
pseudo-explanations of what are essentially semantical phenomena, the
result can only be healthy for all three disciplines.
Before going on to further examples of the tendency to confuse meta-
physical and epistemological matters with phenomena of the semantics
of direct reference, I  want to briefly raise the problem of  cognitive dy-
namics. Suppose that yesterday you said, and believed i t ,  " I t  is a nice
day today." What  does i t  mean to say, today, that  you have retained
that belief? I t  seems unsatisfactory to  just believe the same content
under any old character—where is the retent ion?" Yo u  can't believe
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stratives see "Bob and Carol and Ted and Mice," appendix VII.
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I
later realize, " I  am he" and thus come to think "My pants are on fire." Still later,
I decide that I  was wrong in thinking " I  am he" and conclude "His pants were
on fire." If, in  fact, I  own he, have I  retained my belief that my pants are on fire
simply because I  believe the same content, though under a different character?
(I also deny that content under the former, but for change of tense, character.)
When I first thought 'My pants are on fire," a certain singular proposition, call it
was the object of thought. A t  the later stage, both Eek and its negation are
believed by me. I n  this sense, I  still believe what I  believed before, namely Eek.
But this does not capture my sense of retaining a belief: a  sense that I  associate
with saying that some people have a very rigid cognitive structure whereas others
are very flexible. I t  is tempting to say that cognitive dynamics is concerned not
with retention and change in what is believed, but with retention and change in the
characters under which our beliefs are held. I  think that this is basically correct.
But i t  is not obvious to me what relation between a character under which a belief
is held at one time and the set of characters under which beliefs are held at a later
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that content under the same character. I s  there some obvious standard
adjustment to make to the character, for example, replacing today with
yesterday? I f  so, then a person like Rip van Winkle, who loses track of
time, can't  retain any such beliefs. T h i s  seems strange. C a n  we only
retain beliefs presented under a fixed character? This issue has obvious
and important connections wi th  Lauben's problem in  trying to  com-
municate the thought he expresses wi th  ' I  have been wounded'. Under
what character must his auditor believe Lauben's thought in order for
Lauben's communication to have been successful? I t  is important to
note that i f  Lauben said ' I  am wounded' in  the usual meaning of  ' I ' ,
there is no one else who can report what  he said, using indirect dis-
course, and convey the cognitive significance ( to Lauben) o f  what he
said. Th is  is connected with points made in section VIII, and has inter-
esting consequences for the inevitability of so-called de re constructions
in indirect discourse languages which contain indexical& ( I  use 'indirect
discourse' as a general term for the analogous form of all psychological
verbs.)
A prime example of the confusion of direct reference phenomena with
metaphysical and epistemological ideas was first vigorously called to our
attention by Saul Kripke in Naming and Necessity, I  wish to  parallel
his remarks disconnecting the a pr ior i  and the necessary.
The form of a prioricity that I will discuss is that of logical truth (in
the logic of demonstratives). We saw very early that a truth of the logic
of demonstratives, l ike " I  am here now" need not be necessary. There
are many such cases o f  logical truths which are not necessary. I f  a is
any singular term, then
a =  dthatiod
is a logical truth. Bu t
p ( a  d t h a t [ a ] )
is generally false. W e  can, o f  course, also easily produce the oppositeeffect,
time would constitute retaining the original belief. Where indexicals are involved,
for the reasons given below, we cannot simply require that the very same character
still appear at the later time. Thus the problem of cognitive dynamics can be put
like this w h a t  does i t  mean to say of an individual who at one time sincerely
asserted a sentence containing indexicals that at some later time he has (or has
not) changed his mind with respect to his assertion? What sentence or sentences
must he be willing to assert at the later time?
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may be true, although
dthat[a] =  dthat[M
is not logically true, and is even logically equivalent to the contingency,
a =
(I call 0  and V) logically equivalent when r
0  ? „ / , '  i s  
l o g i c a l l y  
t r u e . )
These cases are reminiscent o f  Kripke's case o f  the terms, 'one meter'
and 'the length of bar s'. But  where Kripke focuses on the special episte-
mological situation of one who is present at the dubbing, the descriptive
meaning associated with our directly referential term dthat[al is carried
in the semantics of the language.
65 How can something be both logically true, and thus certain, and
contingent a t  the same time? I n  the case o f  indexicals the answer iseasy to see.
E. Co ro l l a r y  3 The bearers of logical truth and of contingency are dif-
ferent entities. I t  is the character (or, the sentence, i f  you prefer)
that is logically true, producing a true content in every context. Bu t
it is The content (the proposition, i f  you wil l)  that is contingent ornecessary.
As can readily be seen, the modal logic of  demonstratives is a rich
and interesting thing.
' A  case of a seemingly different kind is that of the logical equivalence between an
arbitrary sentence ch and the result of  prefixing either or both of  the indexical
operators, ' i t  is actually the case that' (symbolized 'A') and ' i t  is now the case
that' (symbolized 'N') .  T h e  biconditional '
-
( t h  4 - 0  A N - d )  
i s  l o g i c a l l y  
t r u e ,  
b u t
prefixing either '0 '  or its temporal counterpart can lead to falsehood. (This case
was adverted to in footnote 28.) I t  is interesting to note, in this case, that the
parallel between modal and temporal modifications of sentences carries over to
indexicals. The foregoing claims are verified by the formal system (sections )(AIM
and XIX, see especially Remark 3). Note that the formal system is constructed
in accordance with Carnap's proposal that the intension of an expression be that
function which assigns to each circumstance, the extension of the expression with
respect to that circumstance, Th is  has commonly been thought to insure that
logically equivalent expressions have the same intension (Church's Alternative 2
among principles of individuation for the notion of sense) and that logically true
sentences express the (unique) necessary proposition. Homework Problem; Whatwent wrong here?
1
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I t  is easy to be taken in by the effortless (but fallacious) move from
certainty (logical t ruth)  t o  necessity. I n  his important article "Three
Grades of  Modal Involvement,"" Quine expresses his scepticism of  the
first grade of modal involvement: the sentence predicate and all it stands
for, and his distaste for the second grade of modal involvement: disguis-
ing the predicate as an operator ' I t  is necessary that'. B u t  he suggests
that no new metaphysical undesirables are admitted until the third grade
of modal involvement: quantification across the necessity operator into
an open sentence.
I must protest. Tha t  first step let in some metaphysical undesirables,
falsehoods. A l l  logical truths are analytic, but they can go false when
you back them up to ' 0 ' .
One other notorious example of a logical truth which is not necessary,
I exist.
One can quickly verify that in every context, this character yields a true
proposition—but rarely a necessary one. I t  seems likely to me that it was
a conflict between the feelings of contingency and of certainty associated
with this sentence that  has led to  such painstaking examination of its
'proofs'. I t  is just a truth of logic!
Dana Scott has remedied one lacuna in this analysis. W h a t  o f  thepremise
I think
and the connective
Therefore
His discovery was that the premise is incomplete, and that the last fivewords
up the logic of demonstratives
had been lost in an early manuscript vers ion.
67
"Proceedings o f  lhe X I  International Congress of Philosophy 14, 65-81; reprinted
in W.  V.  Quine, The  Ways  o f  Paradox (New York :  Random  House, 1966).
6 Aga in ,  i t  is probably a pedagogical mistake to mix  this playful  paragraph wi th thepreceding serious one.
X V I I I .  T h e  Formal  System
Just t o  be sure we have not  overlooked anything, here is a  machineagainst which we can test our intuitions.
The Language LD
The Language LE) is based on first-order predicate logic with identity and
descriptions. W e  deviate slightly from standard formulations in  using
two sorts of variables, one sort for positions and a second for individuals
other than positions (hereafter called simply 'individuals').
Primit ive Symbols
Primitive Symbols for Two Sorted Predicate Logic
O. P u n c t u a t i o n :  ( ,  ), [, I
I. Va r i a b l e s :
(i) A n  infinite set o f  individual variables: V,:
(ii) A n  infinite set of  position variables: Vp
2. P r e d i c a t e s :
(i)
An infinite number o f  m-n-place predicates, for  a l l  naturalnumbers m, n.
(ii) T h e  1-0-place predicate: Exist
(iii) T h e  1-1-place predicate: Located
3. F u n c t o r s :
(i)
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An infinite number o f  m-n-place i-functors (functors which
form terms denoting individuals)
(ii) A n  infinite number o f  m-n-place p-functors (functors which
form terms denoting positions)
4. S e n t e n t i a l  Connectives: A ,  V, —
0, - - t ,5. Q u a n t i f i e r s :  V, 3
6. D e f i n i t e  Description Operator: the
7. I d e n t i t y :  =
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Primitive Symbols for the Logic of Demonstratives
10. T h r e e  1-place sentential operators:
N  ( i t  is now the case that)
A ( i t  is actually the case that)
Y (yesterday, i t  was the case that)
11. A  1-place functor: dthat
12. A n  individual constant (0-0-place i-functor): I
13. A  position constant (0-0-place p-functor); Here
We l l - f o rmed  Expressions
The well-formed erpressions are of three kinds: formulas, position terms
(p-terms), and individual terms (i-terms).
1. ( i )  I f  a E Vi, then a  is an i-term
(ii) I f  a E V
p
,  t h e n  
a  
i s  
a  
p -
t e r
m
2. I f  7r is an m-n-place predicate, a
l
,  a
m  a r e  i -
t e r m s ,  
a n d
are p-terms, then 7ra1 ( 1 , 0 1  . . . A ,  is a formula
3. ( i )  I f  7/ is an m-n-place i-functor, a
l
,  . . . , a , „  . . . ,
1 3 „  a r e  
a s
in 2., then
• n a l  a
m
/
3 1  .
. . I 3
„  
i
s  
a
n  
i -
t e
r m
(ii) I f  I? is an m-n-place p-functor, a l ,  / 3 , ,  are as
in 2., then
is a p-term
Primit ive Symbols for Modal and Tense Logic
8. M o d a l  Operators: 0 ,  0
9. T e n s e  Operators:
F  ( i t  will be the case that)
P ( i t  has been the case that)
G (one day ago, i t  was the case that)
4. I f  0, 7/) are formulas, then (0 A 0), (0  V ?,b), ( 0  W ) ,  (0 4—
,
)•
are formulas
5. I f  0 is a formula and a  E  V,UV
p
,  t h e n  V a 0  
a n d  
3 a 0  
a r e  
f o r m u l a
s
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6. I f  0 is a formula, then
(i) i f  a EV1 then  t h e  a  0 i s  an i-term
(ii) i f  a E V
p
,  t h e n  
t h e  
a  
0  
i
s  
a  
p -
t e
r m
7. I f  a, /5' are either both i-terms or both p-terms, then a  =  i3 is aformula
8. I f  0 is a formula, then 0 0  and 0 0  are formulas
9. I f  0 is a formula, then F0 ,  PO, and GO are formulas
10. I f  0 is a formula, then NO, .40, and Y 0  are formulas
I I .  ( i )  I f  a is an i-term, then dthat iod i s  an i-term
(ii) I f  a is a p-term, then d that [a ]  i s  a p-term
Semantics fo r  L D
LID S t ruc tu res
Def in i t ion;  2 1  is an LD structure i f  there are C, W,  U
,  P ,  T ,  a n d  , T
such that:
1. =
2. C  is a nonempty set (the set of contexts, see 10 below)
3. I f  c E C, then
(i) C A  E U  (the agent of  c)
(ii) C T  E T  (the time of  a)
cp E P (the position o f  a)
(iv) o w  E W (the world of o)
4. W  is a nonempty set (the set of worlds)
5. i t  is a nonempty set (the set of  all individuals, see 9 below)
6. P  is a nonempty set (the set o f  positions, common to all worlds)
7. ' T  is the set o f  integers (thought o f  as the times, common to  allworlds)
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Def in i t ion :  F o r  the following recursive definition, assume that c E C, f
is an assignment, t  E T,  and w E W:
1. I f  a is a variable, IaL j=  .f(oe)
2. k
n i t
, , ,
, r
a t  
•  
•  
•  
•
a
'
r
r
o
3
1  
•  
•  
•  
/
3
,
1  
i
f  
(
l
a
:  
I
•
o
f
t
i
i
,  
•  
•  
•  
1
/
3
1
1
1
c
f
t
w
)  
E  
W
)
3. I f  71 is neither ' I '  nor 'Here' (see 12, 13 below), then
Inett • • • am/31 • • • fin =
Zi(t ,  to)((1 at kitty • • • Ifin 1 of tw )),
i f  none of lai l ,ft,„ 4 3
1
, „ 1 ,
f l w
are t ;
f, otherwise
4
•
k, f lu,(0 A 0) i f f
i f
etc.
5, (i) I f  a E Vi, thenc
f n
o
' U ' i f
(ii) I f  a E V
p
,  t h e n  
k V
a 0  
i
f  
\ I
p E
P ,
(iii) Simi lar ly for 3 4
6. (i) I f  a E Vi, then:
(the unique i  E  Z1 such that  k
n f
. „ , , , , c t . ,  i f
'the a  cblqt,0 t h e r e  is such;
(ii)
t, otherwise
Similarly for a  E Vp
7
. H , ft
, „ c  
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i f  3w 'EW:  KcjtvP0
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(ii)
(iii)
k c
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8. I  is a  function which assigns to  each predicate and functor an
appropriate intension as follows:
(i) I f  Ir is an m-n-predicate, I  i s  a function such that for each
t E T and w / „ ( t ,  w) C ( t i "  X  P
n
)
(ii) I f  ?? is an m-n-place i-functor, I ,  is a function such that  for
each t  E T  and w E W
,  /
n
( t ,  w )  
E (
U  
U  f i l )
( u m
x
7
" )  
( N o
t e :
t is a completely alien entity, in neither Li nor 2 ,  which rep-
resents an 'undefined' value of the function. I n  a normal set
theory we can take t  to be { l i , /
,
} . )
(iii) I f  ?? is an ?n-n-place p-functor, ;  is a function such that  for
each t T  and w E 1
, 7 ( t ,  w )  
E  
I t 1 )
( w h
9. i  EU  i f  (3t E T)(3w E W)((i) E TExist(t, w))
10. I f  c E C, then (CA, OP) E •
1
1 , o c a t e d ( e T ) C W )11. I f  (1,p) E /Loca.ted(t, w), then ( i)  E 2
.
E x i t ( t ,  w )Tru th  and Denotation in a Context
We write: k
2
t
eftw f o r
We write: IcelQteitto f o r
0, when taken in the context c (under the
assignment f  and in the structure V),  is
true with respect to  the t ime t  and the
world w•
The denotation o f  a ,  when taken in the
context c (under the assignment f  and in
the structure 91), with respect to the time
t and the world W
In general we will omit the superscript '91', and we will assume that the
structure a  is (C, W, /1, P, T,1 ) .
De f in i t i on :  f  is an assignment (with respect to (C, T ,  i f :
2
f
1
.
6
(
f
i  
l
2
E
P
V
P  
S
Z  
f  
=  
U
f
2
)
Def in i t i on :  f :  ( f  i ( a ,  f (a ) ) } )  U  { (cx ,x1
(i.e., the assignment which is just like f  except that i t  assigns x to a)
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Def in i t i on :
(i)
I d
t h
a
t [
a l
l c
p
w  
l
a
l
. c
. t
c
,
r
c
w
11.
12.
13. I l l e r e l , f
t
„  =  
c p
I  loptu =  CA
X I X .  Remarks  on  the Formal  System
R e m a r k  E x p r e s s i o n s  containing demonstratives wi l l ,  i n  general,
express different concepts in different contexts. We call the concept ex-
pressed in a given context the Content of  the expression in that context.
The Content of  a sentence in  a context is, roughly, the proposition the
sentence would express i f  uttered in that context. This description is not
quite accurate on two counts. F i r s t ,  i t  is important to distinguish an
utterance from a sentence-in-a-context. T h e  former notion is from the
theory o f  speech acts, the latter from semantics. Utterances take time,
and utterances of  distinct sentences cannot be simultaneous (i.e., in the
same context). B u t  to  develop a logic of demonstratives i t  seems most
natural to be able to evaluate several premises and a conclusion all in
the same context. Thus the notion of cb being true in c and 21 does not
require an utterance o f  O. I n  particular, CA need not be uttering O in
cw a t  c
,
r .  
S e c
o n d
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o
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as dependent on a time as well as a possible world. The time is thought
of as fixed by the context. I f  O is a sentence, the more usual notion of
the proposition expressed by O-in-c is what is here called the Content of
NO in c.
Where r  is either a term or formula,
we write: f r r
f  f o r  
T h e  
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(under the assignment f  and in the
structure 2) .
I f  O is a formula, fO)F
l
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(ii) I f  a is a term, {a}Q
c
l
f =  t h a t  
f u n c t i o n  
w h i c
h  
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n s  
t o  
e a
c h  
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E  
T
and wEFV, lalej
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Remark  2: i f  -10)
2
t
v
, ( 2 , w )  =  
T r u t h .  
R o u g h l
y  
s p e a k i
n g ,  
t h
e
sentence t a k e n  in  context c  is i rac  with respect to t  and w  i f  the
proposition expressed by O-in-the-context-c would be true at the time t
i f  w were the actual world. In  the formal development of pages 544, 545,
and 546, i t  was smoother to ignore the conceptual break marked by the
notion of Content in a context and to directly define truth in  a context
with respect to a possible t ime and world. T h e  important conceptual
role of  the notion of Content is partially indicated by the following twodefinitions.
Def in i t ion :  0  is true in the context c (in the structure 2)  i f  for everyassignment f ,  0 1 ,
2
1 ( c T ,  c
w
)  =  
T r u t h
.
Def in i t ion :  0  is valid in LD ( 0 )  i f  for every LD structure a ,  and
every context c of 91, 0 is true in c (in 2).
Remark  3 :  k ( a  d t h a t i a n ;  A N ) ;  kN(Located I ,  Here);
Exist I. But, 0 ( a  d t h a t [ a ] ) ;  0 ( 0  A N ) ;  O N ( L o -
cated I,  Here); 0 ( E x i s t  1). Also, F ( O  4-4 A N ) .
In the converse direction (where the original validity has the form
DO) we have the usual results in view of the fact that k ( 0 0
Def in i t ion :  I f  al, — , a „  are all the free variables of O in alphabetical
order then the closure o f  O A N V a
l
to its closure.Def in i t ion :  O  is closed i f  0 is equivalent (in the sense of Remark 12)
Remark  4 :  I f  0 is closed, then 0  is true in  c  (and 2.) i f  for every
assignment f ,  time t, and world w,
Definition: Where T is either a term or a formula, the Content of
in the context c ( in the structure21) is Stable i f  for every assignment f ,
{ 11 5  is a constant function (i.e., f r 1 F
.
, ( t . , w )  =  i r e t
f
( t
,
, w
,
) ,  f o r  
a l l  
t ,
t ', w, and w'  in 20.
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R e m a r k  5:  W h e r e  0  is a formula, a  is a term, and f i  is a variable,
each of  the following has a Stable Content in  every context ( in  every
structure): A N ,  dthat[al, 13, I ,  Here.
I f  we were to  extend the notion o f  Content to  apply to operators,
we would see that al l  indexicals (including N,  A, Y,  and dthat) have a
Stable Content in every context. The same is true of the familiar logical
constants although i t  does not hold for the modal and tense operators
(not, at least, according to the foregoing development).
R e m a r k  6: T h a t  aspect of  the meaning of an expression which deter-
mines what i ts Content wi l l  be in each context, we call the Character
of  the expression, A l though a lack of  knowledge about the context (or
perhaps about the structure) may cause one to mistake the Content of a
given utterance, the Character o f  each well-formed expression is deter-
mined by rules of the language (such as rules 1-13 on pages 545 and 546,
which are presumably known to all competent speakers. O u r  notation
'
-
(
0
)
!
I
i
'  
f
o
r  
t
h
e 
C
o
n
t
e
n
t  
o
f  
a
n 
e
x
p
r
e
s
s
i
o
n 
g
i
v
e
s 
a 
n
a
t
u
r
a
l  
n
o
t
a
t
i
o
n 
f
o
r  
t
h
e
Character of  an expression, namely ' {0 ) ' .
De f in i t i on :  W h e r e  r  is either a term or a formula,
is that  function which assigns to  each structure 21,
context c of a, { r ) F.
De f in i t i on :  W h e r e  F is either a term or a formula,
is Sta6le i f  for every structure 21, and assignment f ,
(under f  in 21) is a constant function (i.e., { r }?
.
t
t
in 21),
the Character of r
assignment f ,  and
he Character of
the Character of
t r l !  f o r  all c, c'f
R e m a r k  7: A  formula or term has a Stable Character i f  i t  has the
same Content in every context (for each 91, f ) .
R e m a r k  8: A  formula or term has a Stable Character i f  it contains
n  essential occurrence of a demonstrative.
R e m a r k  9: T h e  logic of demonstratives determines a sublogic of those
formulas of  LD which contain no demonstratives. These formulas (and
their equivalents which contain inessential occurrences o f  demonstra-
tives) are exactly the formulas with a  Stable Character. T h e  logic o f
demonstratives brings a new perspective even to formulas such as these.
The sublogic of LD which concerns only formulas of Stable Character is
not identical with traditional logic. Even for such formulas, the familiar
Principle of  Necessitation ( i f  4 ) ,  then k  DO) fails. A n d  so does its
tense logic counterpart: i f  0 ,  then ( -
,
P - 0  A  - - n
7
- 0  A  
0 ) .  
F r o m
the perspective o f  LD, validity is t ruth in  every possible context. F o r
traditional logic, validity is truth in every possible circumstance. Each
possible context determines a  possible circumstance, bu t  i t  is not the
case that  each possible circumstance is part o f  a possible context. I n
particular, the fact that each possible context has an agent implies that
any possible circumstance in which no individuals exist wi l l  not form a
part o f  any possible context. W i t h i n  LD, a  possible context is repre-
sented by (2t,c) and a possible circumstance by (24,t, w). To  any (21,c),
there corresponds (2i,c(r, cw). Bu t  i t  is not the case that to every (21,t, te)
there exists a context c of  21 such that  t  e l
,  a n d  w  c w .  
T h e  
r e s u l t
is that in LD such sentences as '3x Exist x '  and '3x3p Located x, p' are
valid, although they would not be so regarded in  traditional logic. A t
least not  in  the neotraditional logic that  countenances empty worlds.
Using the semantical developments of pages 543-46, we can define this
traditional sense of  validity (for formulas which do not contain demon-
stratives) as follows. F i r s t  note that  by Remark 7, i f  0 has a  StableCharacter,
!.
t
r
“
,
)
0 
O
f
t
.
0
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Thus for such formulas we can define,
0 is true ai  1,w ( in 21) i f  for every assignment f  and every
context c,
The neotraditional sense o f  validity is now definable as follows,
k ,
r
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at t ,  w (in 21)
(Properly speaking, what I have called the neo-traditional sense of valid-
ity is the notion of validity now common for a quantified S5 modal tense
logic with individual variables ranging over possible individuals and a
predicate of  existence.) Add ing  the subscript I D '  for explicitness, wecan now state some results.
(i) I f  0 contains no demonstratives, i f  k
i
3 O ,  t h e n(ii) r_
A D
B X  
E
x i
s
t  
x
,  
b
u
t  
/
.
3
x  
E
x
i
s
t
LDØ
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Of  course ' 0 3 x  Exist x' is not valid even in LID. Nor are its counterparts,
Exist x ' ,  and ' - P - a x  Exist x ' .
This suggests tha t  we can transcend the context-oriented perspec-
tive of LB by generalizing over times and worlds so as to capture those
possible circumstances (a,t,  tp) which do not correspond to any possible
contexts (2f,c). We have the following result:
(ii i) I f  0 contains no demonstratives,
iff A  A  0)•
Although our definition of the neotraditional sense of validity was moti-
vated by consideration of demonstrative-free formulas, we could apply it
also to formulas containing essential occurrences of  demonstratives. To
do so would nullify the most interesting features of the logic of demon-
stratives. B u t  i t  raises the question, can we express our new sense of
validity in terms of  the neotraditional sense? This can be done:
(iv) T .
,
D  
i f  
H
T
A A
r 0
R e m a r k  10: R i g i d  designators (in the sense of Kripke) are terms with
a Stable Content. Since Kripke does not discuss demonstratives, his ex-
amples all have, in addition, a Stable Character (by Remark 8), Kr ipke
claims that for proper names a, 13 i t  may happen that a  =  0, though
not a priori, is nevertheless necessary. This, in spite of the fact that the
names a, /3 may be introduced by means of descriptions a', (3' for which
a' =  /3' is not necessary. A n  analogous situation holds in L a  Let a',  0 '
be definite descriptions (without free variables) such that a '  =  /3' is not
a priori, and consider the (rigid) terms dthat[cd and dthat[0] which areformed from them, We know that:
(dthat [a l  =  dthatb31 a t =  ,T).
Thus, i f  a' =  /?' is  not  a priori, neither is d that [a l  =  dthat[0'). B u t ,since:
(dthat[a
1
) =  
d t h
a t f /
3 1  
1 7
( d
t h
a t
i a
l  
d
t
h
a
t
[
0
1
)
)
it may happen that  dthat[atj -= d tha t [g l  is necessary. T h e  converse
situation can be illustrated i n  LD. Since ( a  =  d that lap is valid (see
Remark 3), i t  is surely capable of being known a priori. B u t  i f  a lacks
a Stable Content (in some context c), El(a =  dthat[aj) wi l l  be false.
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Remark  11 :  O u r  0-0-place i-functors are not proper names, i n  the
sense o f  Kripke, since they do not  have a  Stable Content, B u t  they
can easily be converted by  means o f  stabilizing influence o f  'dthat' .
Even dthat ia l  lacks a  Stable Character. T h e  process b y  which such
expressions are converted into expressions wi th  a  Stable Character is
'dubbing'—a form of  definition in which context may play an essential
role. T h e  means to  deal w i th  such context-indexed definitions is not
available in our object language.
There would, o f  course, be no difficulty in supplementing our lan-
guage with a syntactically distinctive set o f  0-0-place i-functors whose
semantics requires them to have both a Stable Character and a Stable
Content in  every context. •
V a r i a b l e s  
a l r e a d y  
b e h a v e  
t h i s  
w a y
,  
w h a
t  
i
s
wanted is a class of constants that  behave, in these respects, l ike vari-ables.
The difficulty comes i n  expressing the definition. M y  thought is
that when a name, like 'Bozo', is introduced by someone saying, in some
context c*, "Let's call the Governor, 'Bozo'", we have a context-indexed
definition of the form. A  =
0  a ,  w h e r e  
A  i s  
a  
n e w  
c o n s t a
n t  
( h e r
e ,  
' B o z
o ' )
and a  is some term whose denotation depends on context (here, ' the
Governor). The  intention of  such a dubbing is, presumably, to  induce
the semantical clause: for all c, { A } Ft
/ { a }
e !
.  S u c h  
a  
c l a u s e  
g i v e s  
A  
a
Stable Character. The context-indexing is required by the fact that the
Content of  a (the 'definiens) may vary from context to context. Thus
the same semantical clause is not induced by  taking either A  =  a  oreven A =  d t h a t H  as an axiom
I think it is likely that such definitions play a practically (and perhaps
theoretically) indispensable role in the growth of language, allowing us
to introduce a  vast stock o f  names on the basis of  a meager stock o f
demonstratives and some ingenuity in the staging of demonstrations.
Perhaps such introductions should not be called 'definitions' at all,
since they essentially enrich the expressive power of the language. What
a nameless man may express by ' I  am hungry' may be inexpressible in
remote contexts, B u t  once he says "Let's call me 'Bozo'", his Contentis accessible to us all.
Remark  12:  T h e  strongest form of  logical equivalence between two
formulas 0 and 0'  is sameness o f  Character, { 0 }  =, { 0 9 ,  Th is  form of
synonymy is expressible in terms of validity.
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{ 0 } =  {01  i f  1
5
9  A  
" P '
-
' ( C /
5  
0 '
)  
A  
(
0  
' -
' '  
' )
]
[Using Remark 9  (iH) and dropping the condition, which was stated
only t o  express t he  intended range o f  applicability o f  w e  have:
g5} =  {(b'} i f f  ,
r ( 0  
0 ' ) . ]  
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opposed to dubbings) are intended to  introduce a  short expression as
a mere abbreviation o f  a longer one, the Character o f  the defined sign
should be the same as the Character of the definiens. Thus, within 1,D,
definitional axioms must take the unusual form indicated above.
R e m a r k  13: I f  0 is a variable of the same sort as the term a  but is
not free in ce, then fd tha t [a ] }  =  i the  A N 0  c ( ) ) .  Thus  for every
formula 0, there can be constructed a formula 0' such that 0 '  contains
no occurrence of 'dthat' and { 0 }  =  {0"}.
R e m a r k  14: Y  (yesterday) and G (one day ago) superficially resemble
one another in view of  the fact that ( Y 0  G O ) .  B u t  the former is
a demonstrative whereas the latter is an iterative temporal operator.
"One day ago i t  was the case that  one day ago i t  was the case that
John yawned" means that John yawned the day before yesterday. B u t
"Yesterday i t  was the case that  yesterday i t  was the case that  John
yawned" is only a stutter.
Notes on  Possible Ref inements
1. T h e  primitive predicates and functors of first-order predicate logic
are all taken to be extensional. Alternatives are possible.
2. M a n y  conditions might be added on p
;  m a n y  
a l t e r n a t i v e s  
m i g h t  
b e
chosen for T  I f  the elements of T do not have a natural relation to
play the role of <, such a relation must be added to the structure.
3. W h e n  K  is a set of 1,11 formulas, K  i s  easily defined in any of
the usual ways.
4. A s p e c t s  o f  the contexts other than CA, cp, CT, and cw would be
used i f  new demonstratives (e.g., pointings, You, etc.) were added
to the language. (Note that the subscripts A, P, T,  W are external
parameters. T h e y  may be thought o f  as functions applying to
contexts, with CA being the value of A for the context c.)
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5. S p e c i a l  continuity conditions through time might be added for thepredicate 'Exist'.
6. I f  individuals lacking positions are admitted as agents of  contexts,
3(iii) of page 543 should be weakened to: cp E P U -in-. I t  would
no longer be the case that: L o c a t e d  I, Here. I f  individuals also
lacking temporal location (disembodied minds?) are admitted as
agents of contexts, a similar weakening is required of  3(ii). In  anycase i t  would still be true that E x i s t
XX. Adding 'Says'
[This section is not yet written. What  follows is a rough outline of whatis to come.]
The point of this section is to show, in a controlled experiment, that
what Quine called Me relational sense of certain intensional operators is
unavoidable, and to explore the logical, as opposed to  epistemological,features of  language which lead to this result.
I  have already mentioned, in connection with Dr. Lauben, that  when
x says 'I  have been wounded' and y wishes to report in indirect discourse
exactly what x said, y has a problem, I t  wil l  not do for y  to say 'x  said
that I  have been wounded'. According to our earlier remarks, i t  should
be correct for y to report x's content using a character appropriate to the
context of the report. For  example, accusingly: 'You said that you had
been wounded', or quantificationally, ' (3z)(Fz A x  said that z had been
wounded)' where x  atone satisfied I  wi l l  t r y  to  show that  such
constructions are the inevitable result o f  the attempt t o  make (third
person) indirect discourse reports o f  the f irst person direct discourse
sayings when those sayings involve indexicals,
The situation regarding the usual epistemic verbs—'believes', 'hopes',
'knows', 'desires', 'fears', etc.—is, I  believe, essentially similar to that of
'says'. Each has, or  might have, a  direct discourse sense in  which the
character which stands for the cognitive significance o f  the thought is
given (he thinks, 'My  God! I t  is my pants that  are on fire.') a s  well
as an indirect discourse sense in  which only the content need be given
(he thinks that  i t  is his pants that  are on f i r e ) .
6 8  I f  t h i s  i s  
c o r r e c t ,
and i f  indexicals are featured in  the language of thought (as suggested
66 My notion of 'indirect discourse' forms of language is linked to Frege's notion of
an 'ungerade' (often translated 'oblique') context. My terminology is intended toecho his.
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earlier), then any indirect discourse reports of someone's thought (other
than first person on the spot reports) must  contain those features—
de re constructions, referential occurrences, quantification in, relational
senses—that have so puzzled me, and some others, since the appearance
of "Quantifiers and Propositional A t t i tudes . "
69 What is special and different about the present approach is the at-
tempt t o  use the distinction between direct and indirect discourse t o
match the distinction between character and content. Thus  when you
wonder, ' Is  that  me?', i t  is correct to  report you as having wondered
whether you are yourself. These transformations are traced to  the in-
dexical form of  your inner direct discourse rather than to any particu-
lar referential intentions. T h e  idea is that  the ful l  analysis of indirect
discourse includes mention of the suppressed character of the direct dis-
course event which the indirect discourse reports, thus:
3c, C [c is a context A C  is a character A x  is the agent of c
A x  direct-discourse-verb C  at the time t o f  c A the content
of C in c is t h a t - 1
approximates a full analysis of
x indirect-discourse-verb that  a t  t.
Rather than t r y  to include all these semantical ideas in an object lan-
guage which includes the direct discourse forms of the verbs, the object
language will include, as is usual, only the indirect discourse forms. The
information about the character o f  the direct discourse event wi l l  pro-
vide the metalinguistic data against which the truth of  object languagesentences is tested,n
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Quine, In his "Reply to Kaplan" i n  Words and Objections, ed. D. Davidson at
al. (Dordrecht: Reidel, 1969), raises the question—in the idiom of "Quantifiers
and Propositional Attitudes" (Journal of Philosop)5y 53 (1956); reprinted in Mar-
tinich, op. cit.)—which of the names of a thing are to count as exportable? M y
point here is that the indexical names must be exportable, not because of some
special justification for the transformation from a de dicta occurrence to a de is
occurrence, but, because indexicals are devices of direct reference and have no de
dicto occurrences. I  am reminded of the Zen ko-an: How do you get the goose outof the bottle? Answer: I t 's  out!
70
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cases of suspension of belief (I believe, 'that man's pants are on fire' but at the
moment neither assent to nor deny 'my pants are on fire') as does its counterpart in
section XI of "Quantifying In." Burge, in "Kaplan, Quine, and Suspended Belief,"
Philosophical Studies 31 (1977): 197-203, proposes a solution to the problem of
section XI which he believes is in the spirit of  Quine's formulations. A  similar
What is not yet clear to me is whether all directly referential occur-
rences of terms within the scope of indirect discourse epistemic verbs are
to be justified solely on the basis o f  a like (though generally distinct)
term in the direct discourse event or whether in some cases the English
idioms which we symbolize with quantification in (for example, 'There
is someone whom Holmes believes to have shot himself') involve some
element o f  know;ng-who or believing-who. To  put the question another
way: are all the cases that Quine describes, and others similar, which
irresistibly suggest the symbolic idiom of quantification in, accounted for
by the semantics o f  direct reference (including indexicals and possibly
other expressions as well) as applied to  the (putative) direct discourse
events? "Quanti fy ing In" suffers from the lack o f  an adequate seman-
tics of  direct reference, but its explicandum includes the epistemological
idea of knowing-who, which goes beyond what can be analyzed simply
in terms o f  direct reference, W h e n  Ingrid hears someone approaching
through the fog and knows 'Someone is approaching' and even knows
'That person is approaching', is i t  justified to say that there is someone
whom Ingrid knows to be approaching? O r  must we have, in  addition
to the indexical ' that person', recognition on Ingrid's part o f  who i t  is
that is approaching? M y  present thought is that the cases which irre-
sistibly suggest the symbolic idiom of  quantification in  involve, in  an
ambiguous way, two elements: direct reference (on which we are close
to getting clear, I  hope) and recognit ion.
71 ( T h e  l a t t e r  
i s  m y  
n e w  
t e r m
proposa/ in the present context would seem starkly inappropriate, But  there has
been a shift in task from "Quantifying In" to the present attempt, In  large part the
shift is to a course outlined by Burge in the last two pages of the above-mentioned
article and urged by him, in conversation, for several years. The point only beganto sink in when I came on i t  myself from a different angle.
72 There is another form of common speech which may be thought to suggest formal-
ization by quantification in. I  call this form the pseudo de re. A typical example is,
"John says that the lying S.O.B. who took my car is honest." I t  is clear that Jolm
does not say, "The lying 5.0.B, who took your car is honest." Does John say '8 is
honest" for  some directly referential term 6 which the reporter believes to refer to
the lying S.CD,B, who took his car? Not  necessarily. John may say something as
simple as, "The man I sent to you yesterday is honest." The reporter has simply
substituted his description for John's. What justifies this shocking falsification of
John's speech'? Nothing! But we do it, and often recognize--or don't care—when
it is being done. The form lends itself to strikingly distorted reports. As Church
has shown, in his Introduction to Mathematical Logic (Princeton: Princeton Uni-
versity Press, 1956), on page 25, when John says "Sir Walter Scott is the author of
Wawerley" use of the pseudo de re form (plus a quite plausible synonymy trans-
formation) allows the report, "John says that there are twenty-nine counties in
Utah"! I  do not see that the existence of the pseudo de re form of report poses
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for knowing-(or believing)-who.) The term is chosen to reflect the idea
that the individual in question is identified wi th respect to  some prior
or independent information—re-cognition—not immediately connected
with the current attribution.) O f  the two elements the former is seman-
tical; the  latter, frankly epistemological. T h e  English idiom 'There is
someone such that Ingrid indirect-discourse-propositional-attitude-verb
that . . . he  a l w a y s  implies that a singular proposition is the object
of Ingrid's thought (and thus that some directly referential term a  oc-
curred in her inner direct discourse) and may sometimes imply (or only
suggest?) t h a t  Ingrid recognized, who oe is. I  offer no analysis of  thelatter no t ion .
72 In the first paragraph, I  referred t o  a  controlled experiment. B y
that I  mean the following. Accept ing the metaphor o f  "inner direct
discourse events" and "indirect discourse reports" in connection with the
usual epistemic verbs, I  want to examine the logical relations between
these two. Bu t  the study is complicated by at least three factors which
obscure the issues I wish to bring to light. First, there is no real syntax
to the language o f  thought. T h u s ,  even i n  the case o f  the simplest
thoughts the relation between the syntax of the sentential complement
to t h e
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Second, in containing images, sounds, odors, etc., thought is richer than
the language o f  the report. M i g h t  these perceptual elements play a
role i n  determining logical relations? T h i r d ,  thought ranges from the
completely explicit (inner speech) to  the entirely implicit (unconscious
beliefs which explain actions) and through a  variety o f  occurrent and
dispositional forms. T h i s  makes i t  hard to  pin down the whole direct
discourse event. These three factors suggest taking as a  paradigm of
the relation between direct and indirect discourse—direct and indirectdiscourse!
Even when reporting the (outer) discourse of  another, at least three
obscure irrelevancies (for our purposes) remain. F i r s t ,  i f  Christopher
speaks in a language different from that of the report, we have again the
problem of translation (analogous to, though perhaps less severe than,
any issues of sufficient theoretical interest to snake i t  worth pursuing.
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Hintikka, Castalieda and others. I n  connection with the proposal that r
o ,  k n o w swho a is' can be symbolized '
-
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knowledge of the logical truth r
d t h a t [ a ]  =  
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irect reference, to '3x(rt knows that x = a ) ' .  This shows only that a 'recognition
sense of knowing a singular proposition is not definable, in the obvious way, in
terms of a purely direct reference sense of knowing a singular proposition.
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that of translating the language of thought). We control this by assum-
ing the direct discourse to be in  the language of the indirect discourse
report. Second, as Carnap once pointed out to me, i f  Christopher's dis-
course had the form '
-
( A A  7 1 ;
1  e v e n  
t h e  
s t r i c t
e s t  
c o u
r t  
w o
u l
d  
a c
c e
p t  
a
s
true the testimony, 'Christopher said that A  cb
.
' W h a t  l o g i c a l  
r a n s -
formations on the original discourse would be allowed in the report? ( I f
Christopher says '3x x is round', may we report him as saying that 3y
y is ound?) We control this by allowing no logical transformations (we
are explicating literal indirect discourse). Third,  i f  in saying 'The circle
can't be squared' Christopher thought that 'can't' was synonymous with
'should not'  rather than 'cannot', should he be reported as having said
that the circle can't be squared? We control this by assuming that our
speakers make no linguistic errors.
What then remains of  the logic? Is  the move from direct discourse
to literal indirect discourse not  simply the result o f  disquotation (and
decapitaliztion) plus the addition of 'that', as in:
Christopher says 'the world is round'
.•. Christopher says that the world is round
But how then are we to report Dr. Lauben's saying, ' I  have been wound-
ed'? Certainly not as, 'Dr. Lauben says that I  have been wounded'!
Even in this highly antiseptic environment, the logic of says should
provide us w i th  a  ful l  measure o f  that baffling and fascinating de re
versus de diet°, notional versus relational, etc., behavior. A n d  here,
using the conceptual apparatus o f  the semantics of direct reference, wemay hope to identify the source of  these antics.
[I also hope to distinguish, in  discussing reports o f  self-attribution,
x says that x  is a fool, from x says-himself to be a fool.]
X X I .  Russel l  on Egocentr ic  Par t icu lars  and T h e i rDispensabi l i ty
In chapter V I I  o f  Inquiry Into Meaning and Tr u t h ,
7 3  R u s s e l l  g i v e s  
a
series of atrocious arguments for the conclusion that "[indexicals] are not
needed in  any part of the description of  the world, whether physical or
psychological." This is a happy no-nonsense conclusion for an argument
that begins by remarking " A physicist wi l l  not say ' I  saw a. table', but
like Neurath or Julius Caesar, 'Ot to  saw a table'." [Why Julius Caesar
would be provoked to say 'Otto saw a table', is unexplained.]
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Let us examine Russell's conclusion without prejudice to  his argu-
ment. [What  follows is an outline.]
In brief, there are essentially two points. First: i f  we have both the
indexicals and an unlimited supply of unused directly referential proper
names, and we can do instantaneous dubbing, then in  each context c
for any sentence 0  containing indexicals we can produce a sentence 0*
whose character is fixed and whose content is the same as that of 0 in c.
In this sense, i f  you can describe i t  with indexicals you can describe i t
w i t hou t .
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take time, ( i i )  the indexicals retain a kind of epistemic priority.
The second point  is: g iven any p r io r  collection o f  proper names,
there wi l l  be things, times, places, etc., without a name. How do I  say
something about these unnamed entities? (E.g., how do I  tell you that
your pants are on fire—now? I t  may be that nothing in sight, including
us, and no nearby time has a name.)
There are two cases, I t  seems most l ikely that without indexicals
some entities cannot even be uniquely described. I n  this case we are
really in trouble (unless Russell believes in the identity of indescribables
—objects lacking uniquely characterizing descriptions) because without
indexicals we cannot freely introduce new names. I f  every entity can be
uniquely described, there is still the problem of not presenting the right
content under the right character required to motivate the right action
(recall the discussion on pages 532-33), T h e  proposition expressed by
'the pants belonging to  the s  F x  are on fire a t  the t  G t '  is not  the
proposition I want to express, and certainly does not have the character
I wish to convey.
75
X X I I .  O n  P r o p e r  N a m e s
[Some thoughts on proper names from the perspective o f  the formal
system are contained in Remark 11, page 551. What  follows is the most
hastily wri t ten section o f  this draft. I  sketch a  view that  is  mainly
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XXII,
75 Some interesting arguments of a different sort for the indispensability of indexicals
are given by Burge in "Belief De Re," JoItrnal of P],ilo.5oph1, 74 (1977): 338-62,
and by Bar-Hillel in his pioneering work, "Indexical Expressions," Mind (1954).
In connection with the arguments of Burge and Bar-Hillel it would be interesting
to check on some related empirical issues involving linguistic universals. D o  all
languages have a first person singular form? Do they all have all of the standardindexicals?
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negative, without including much supporting argumentation (several of
the omitted arguments seem both tedious and tendentious). M y  current
inclination is to drop this whole section from the final draft.]
A word is an expression along with its meaning. When two expres-
sions have the same meaning, as with "can't" and "cannot", we call the
two words synonyms. W h e n  two meanings have the same expression,
we call the two words homonyms. I n  the latter case we also say that
the expression is ambiguotts. (Probably we would say that the word is
ambiguous, but  accept my terminology for what follows.) I n  a  disam-
biguated language, semantics can associate meanings with expressions.
Even in a language containing ambiguities, semantics can associate a set
of meanings with an expression. Bu t  given an utterance, semantics can-
not tell us what expression was uttered or what language it was uttered
in. Th i s  is a presemantic task. When I  utter a particular vocable, for
example, the one characteristic o f  the first person pronoun o f  English,
you must decide what word I  have spoken or indeed, i f  I  have spoken
any word a t  all ( i t  may have been a cry o f  anguish). I n  associating a
word with my utterance you take account of a variety of features o f  the
context o f  utterance that help to  determine what I  have said but  that
need not be any part of what I  have said. M y  egotism, my intonation,
my demeanor, may all support the hypothesis that it was the first person
pronoun of English. But  these aspects of personality, fluency, and mood
are no part o f  any semantic theory o f  the first person pronoun. T h e
factors I  have cited are not, o f  course, cr i ter ial  for the use o f  the first
person pronoun. Wha t  are the criteria? What  would definitively settle
the question? I  don't know, I  th ink this is a very difficult question.
But among the criteria there must be some that touch on the utterer's
intention to use a word in conformity with the conventions of a particu-
lar linguistic community. For proper name words, in part because they
are so easily introduced, this aspect of  the presemantic determination isespecially impo tant.
According t o  the causal chain or  chain o f  communication theory,
there are two critical intentions associated wi th  ti le use o f  the proper
name word. O n e  is the intention t o  use the word w i th  the meaning
given i t  by  the person from whom you learned the word. T h e  other
is the contrary intention to create (and perhaps simultaneously use) a
proper name word to refer to  a given object irrespective o f  any prior
meanings associated with the expression chosen as a vehicle. One who
uses a  proper name word w i th  the f irst intention generally (bu t  not
always) believes that someone originated the word by using i t  with the
560 D a v i d  Kaplan
second intention, and—according to the causal chain theory—intends to
refer to  the given ob jec t :
76 In "Bob and Carol and Ted and Alice," appendix IX, I introduce the
notion of a dubbing for what I  took to be the standard form of introduc-
tion of  a proper name word. Tha t  notion has been mistakenly taken to
imply—what I deliberately sought to evoke—a formal public ceremony.
What I  actually had in mind was a use of  a proper name word with the
second intention: the intention to originate a word rather than conform
to a prior usage. Thus a fleeting "Hi-ya, Beautiful" incorporates all the
intentional elements required for  me to  say that  a dubbing has taken
place. I  believe that my notion here is closely related to DonneIlan's no-
tion of a referential use of a definite description. DonneIlan's distinction
between referential and attr ibutive uses o f  definite descriptions is eas-
ily and naturally extended to referential and attributive uses of proper
names. When  the intention to conform to a preestablished convention
is absent we have the pure referential use. I n  this case, when a  proper
name is in question, I  take i t  that an internal, subjective, dubbing has
occurred. When a definite description is in question, again the speaker
does not intend to give the expression its conventional meaning although
he mak intend to make use of the conventional meaning in conveying who
it  is that is being referred to  or for some other purpose associated with
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duces a proper name word with the second intention. Must he be acquainted with
the object, directly acquainted, en rapport, perceiving it, causally connected, Or
what? M y  liberality with respect to the introduction of directly referring terms
by means of 'dthat' extends to proper names, and I would allow an arbitrary def-
inite description to give us the object we name. "Let 's  call the first child to be
born in the twenty-first century 'Newman V." But I  am aware that this is a very
controversial position. Perhaps some of the sting can be removed by adopting an
idea of Gilbert Harman. Normally one would not introduce a proper name or a
dthat-term to correspond to each definite description one uses. Bu t  we have the
means to do so if we wish. Should we do so, we are enabled to apprehend singular
propositions concerning remote individuals (those formerly known only by descrip-
tion). Recognizing this, we refrain. What  purpose—other than to confound the
skeptics—is served by direct reference to whosoever may be the next president of
Brazil? The introduction of a new proper name by means of a dubbing in terms of
description and the active contemplation of characters involving dthat- terms—two
mechanisms for providing direct reference to the denotation of an arbitrary def-
inite description—constitute a form of cognitive restructuring; they broaden our
range of thought. To take such a step is an action normally not performed at all,
and rarely, i f  ever, done capriciously. The fact that we have the means—without
special experience, knowledge, or whatever—to refer directly to the myriad indi-
viduals we can describe, does not imply that we will do so. And i f  we should havereason to do so, why not?
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the act o f  utterance (as in "Hi-ya, Beautiful"). What  is important here
is that the speaker intends to be creating a meaning for the expression
in question rather than following conventions. Dubbings, whether aimed
at introducing a relatively permanent sense for the expression or only
aimed at attaching a nonce-sense to the expression, are unconventionaluses of  language. Dubbings create words.
In many, perhaps most, uses o f  definite descriptions there is a mix-
ture of  the intention to follow convention with the intention to refer to
a preconceived individual. The same mixture of 'attributive' and 'refer-
ential' intentions can occur with a proper name. I f  I introduce a name
into your vocabulary by means o f  false introduction ( "Th is  is Jaakko
Hintikka", but i t  isn't), you are left with an undiscriminated tangle o f
attributive (to refer to Jaakko Hintikka) and referential ( to  refer to the
person to  whom you were introduced) intentions associated wi th your
subsequent uses of  the expression 'Jaakko Hintikka'. There are several
ways in which one might attempt to account for these mixed intentions
in a general theory of language. First, we might distinguish two notions:
speaker's-reference and semantic-reference. The presence o f  an attribu-
tive intention justifies giving the expressions a conventional meaning and
thus allows us to claim that preexisting words were used. Whereas the
presence o f  a referential intention (not just a belief that  the semantic
referent is the given object, but an independent intention to refer to the
given object) justifies the claim that the speaker is referring to the given
object independent of any particular interpretation of the expressions he
used as words and independent o f  whether the utterance has an inter-
pretation as words. A  second way of accounting for mixed intentions of
this kind is to assume that one o f  the two intentions must be dominant.
I f  the referential intention dominates, we regard the utterance, on the
model o f  "Hi-ya, Beautiful," as an apt (or inept, as the case may be)
introduction o f  a proper name word (or phrase). Thus ,  as essentially
involving a dubbing. O n  this way of accounting for mixed intentions,
a referential use o f  an expression would endow the expression wi th  a
semantic referent identical with the speaker's referent. '
"  This is not an unnatural way to accotmt for the use of the proper name word in
the false introduction case, but i t  does seem a. bit strange in the case of a definite
description. In  that case i t  involves hypothesizing that the speaker intended the
description expression to have a meaning which made the given object its semantic
referent, and only believed that the conventional meaning would do this, a belief
that he is prepared to give up rather than acknowledge that the semantic referent
of his words was not the given object. Something like this seems to happen when
descriptions grow capitals, as in 'The Holy Roman Empire', and in other cases as
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My aim in the foregoing is to emphasize how delicate and subtle our
analysis of the context of utterance must be for the presemantic purpose
of determining what words, i f  any, were spoken. I  do this to make plausi-
ble my view that—assuming the causal chain theory of reference--proper
names are not indexicals. The  contextual feature which consists of  the
causal history of a particular proper name expression in the agent's idi-
oiect seems more naturally to be regarded as determining what word was
used than as fixing the content o f  a single context-sensitive word. A l -
though i t  is true that two utterances of  'Aristotle' in different contexts
may have different contents, I  am inclined to  attribute this difference
to the fact that  distinct homonymous words were uttered rather than
a context sensitivity in  the character o f  a single word 'Aristotle'. U n -
like indexicals like ' I ' ,  proper names really are ambiguous. T h e  causal
theory o f  reference tells us, i n  terms o f  contextual features (including
the speaker's intentions) which word is being used in a given utterance.
Each such word is directly referential (thus it  has a fixed content), and it
also has a fixed character. Therefore, in the case of proper name words,
all three kinds of  meaning—referent, content, and character—collapse.
In this, proper name words are unique. They have the direct reference
of indexicals, bu t  they are not context-sensitive. Proper  name words
are l ike indexicals that  you can carry away from their original context
without affecting their content. Because o f  the collapse o f  character,
content, and referent, i t  is not unnatural to  say o f  proper names that
they have no meaning other than their referent.
Some may claim that  they simply use 'indexical' in a  wider sense
than I  (perhaps to mean something like 'contextual'). B u t  we must be
wary of an overbroad usage. Is every ambiguous expression an indexical
because we look to utterer's intentions to disambiguate? Indeed, is every
expression an indexical because i t  might have been a groan?
I f  the character and content of  proper name words is as I  have de-
scribed i t  (according to the causal theory), then the informativeness of
,-, )
3 '  
,  
w
i
t
h  
c
e  
a
n
d  
9  
p
r
o
p
e
r  
n
a
m
e
s
,  
i
s  
n
o
t  
a
c
c
o
u
n
t
e
d  
f
o
r  
i
n  
t
e
r
m
s  
o
f
differences in  either content or character. T h e  problem is that proper
names do not seem to f i t  into the whole sernantical and epistemological
scheme as I have developed it. I  claimed that a competent speaker knows
the character o f  words. T h i s  suggests (even i f  it does not imply)  that
i f  two proper names have the same character, the competent speaker
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knows that. Bu t  he doesn't. W h a t  is perhaps even more astounding is
that I  may introduce a new proper name word and send i t  on its jour-
ney. When i t  returns to me—perhaps slightly distorted phonologically
by i ts  t r ip  through other dialects—I can competently take i t  into my
vocabulary without recognizing i t  as the very same word! Shocking!
In earlier sections of this paper I have tried to show that many of the
metaphysical and epistemological anomalies involving proper names had
counterparts involving indexicals, and further that in the case of index-
icals these wonders are easily explained by an obvious theory. Insofar
as I  am correct i n  regarding the anomalies as counterparts, t he  the-
ory of indexicals may help to break down unwarranted resistance to the
causal chain theory. I t  may also suggest the form of a general semantical
and epistemological scheme comprehending both indexicals and proper
names. T h i s  is not the place to  attempt the latter task; m y  purpose
here is simply to show that i t  is not t r iv ia1.
78 T h o s e  w h o  
s u g g e s t  
t h a t
proper name  are merely one species o f  indexical depreciate the power
and the mystery of the causal chain theory.
well, for  example Russell's 'denoting phrases' which do not denote, B u t  i t  t i l lseems strange.
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comprehending p r o p e r  names" are such as these, I s  the work of the causal
chain theory presemantic, as I  have claimed? D o  proper names have a kind of
meaning other than reference? Does the causal chain theory itself constitute a
kind of meaning for proper names that is analogous to character for indexicals
(but which, perhaps, gives all proper names the same meaning in this sense)? Are
proper names words of any particular language? Is there synonymy between proper
names that are expressed differently (as there is between 'can't' and 'cannot')?
How should we describe the linguistic competence of one who does not know that
Hesperus is Phosphorus? Is  he guilty of linguistic error? Should we say he does
not know what words he speaks? Does he know that 'Hesperus' and Phosphorus'
are different words? A r e  they? I s  i t  really possible, as I  claim, to  account for
the semantics of indexicals without making use of the full conceptual resources
required to account for the semantics of proper names? I  raise these issues—and
there are others—within the framework of a hypothetical acceptance of the causal
chain theory. There are other issues, of a quite different kind, involved in trying
to fil l out some details of the causal chain theory itself. For example, if one who
has received some particular proper name expression, say, "James", hundreds of
times, uses that expression attributively as a proper name, and has in  mind no
particular source, how do we decide which branch to follow back? The first set of
issues seems to me to be largely independent of the details of the relevant causalchains.
